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Harvard University and NBER
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Although there is substantial professional and public interest in the
recent proposals to replace the existing personal and corporate income
taxes with a consumption tax, there has been little attention to the effect
of such a tax change on pre-tax interest rates and other pre-tax factor
incomes. Despite the general absence of formal analyses, some econo-
mists have concluded that shifting to a consumption-type tax would
lead, because such a tax would exempt interest income and encourage
additional saving, to lower pre-tax interest rates.
The most widely cited such statement is by Hall and Rabushka (1995),
who say that long-term interest rates would decline by 20 percent if the
existing U.S. tax system were replaced by a consumption tax of the type
that they advocate.1 Hall (1996) presents the only formal analytic model of
the effect on the interest rate of shifting to a consumption tax. His analysis
deals with an economy of infinite-lived individuals in which the net-of-tax
interest rate would be a constant determined by the time preference pa-
The author is a professor of economics at Harvard University, and the President of the
National Bureau of Economic Research. He is grateful to Erzo Luttmer for research assis-
tance and discussions. A more technical version of this paper appears in Feldstein (1995b).
Each section of that paper provides a more formal algebraic demonstration of the state-
ments in the corresponding section of the current paper.
1Toder (1995) also concludes that any shift to a consumption-type tax would be likely to
reduce real interest rates.174Feldstein
rameter of the representative individual. Eliminating the interest income
tax in such an economy would therefore reduce the pre-tax interest rate to
the equilibrium net interest rate.
In this paper, I explain why the opposite may well be true: substituting
a consumption tax for the existing personal and corporate income taxes
may raise pre-tax interest rates. The analysis indicates that whether the
pre-tax rate of interest rises or falls depends on the strength of the per-
sonal saving response and the nature of the capital-market relation
between debt and equity yields. With plausible parameter values, the
analysis suggests that the shift from an income tax to a consumption tax is
more likely to raise interest rates than to lower them.2
An important common feature of all the current consumption-tax pro-
posals is to eliminate the tax on corporate profits. Corporations would,
under some proposals, continue to make tax payments, but the tax col-
lected from the corporations would become either a tax on the firm's
non-cash labor compensation or a consumption-type value-added tax.3
The failure to take the elimination of the corporate tax into account has
led much of the discussion of consumption taxes to wrong conclusions
about the impact on interest rates of shifting to a consumption tax.4
Although there appear to be several different types of consumption
taxesconsumed income taxes that permit a deduction for all net saving
but continue to tax investment income, taxes that exclude investment
income but do not allow a deduction for saving, value-added taxes, and
national retail sales taxesall of these different variants are in fact
equivalent in the sense that after the transition they all define the same
consumption opportunities for individuals who have the same wage
income (i.e., they imply the same lifetime budget constraints). This
equivalence is demonstrated explicitly in Appendix A to this paper. The
paper itself uses the term consumption tax to refer to a tax that excludes
all investment income at the corporate and personal level, but exactly the
same conclusions would follow for a consumed-income tax, a national
retail sales tax, or a value-added tax.
The paper begins in section 1 by discussing the effect that shifting
from the existing income-tax system to a consumption tax would have
on the rate of interest if individual saving remained unchanged. Section
2Bradford (1995) notes that the effect of a consumption tax on the rate of interest depends
on the relative elasticities of the supply of capital and the demand for capital.
As noted in footnote 4, the Hall-Rabushka tax paid by companies is a tax on noncash
labor compensation.
Neither Hall (1996) nor Bradford (1995) deals with the effect of eliminating the corporate
income tax.Consumption Tax and Interest Rates175
2 then extends the analysis to an economy in which the saving rate
responds to changes in the net of tax rate of interest. The analysis of
these two sections emphasizes that the shift to a consumption tax would
eliminate the corporate tax on investment income as well as the personal
tax on interest and dividends. Eliminating the corporate tax raises the
capital income available at the company level to pay interest and divi-
dends. Section 3 examines the sensitivity of the results to the assumed
relation between debt and equity yields. Section 4 introduces the role of
inflation. The fifth section then brings together these separate analyses
to discuss the effects of changing the tax structure in a growing economy
with inflation and with interest-sensitive saving behavior. There is a
brief concluding section that comments on the generalization of this
analysis to recognize international capital flows and different types of
domestic borrowers and lenders.
1. THE EFFECT OF A CONSUMPTION TAX WITH A
FIXED CAPITAL STOCK5
This section considers how shifting from the existing personal and corpo-
rate income taxes to a consumption tax would alter the equilibrium rate
of interest and the net return to savers in a simplified setting with a fixed
capital stock employed in the corporate sector and a zero rate of infla-
tion.6 The fixed capital stock in this one-sector economy implies that the
corporate borrowers earn a fixed pre-tax marginal product of capital.
Under the current tax rules, the company's taxable income is equal to the
marginal product of capital (net of depreciation) minus the interest pay-
ments made to the providers of debt capital.7 The return net of taxes and
of interest payments is then available for the equity owners of the com-
pany, either as dividends or as retained earnings.
Eliminating the corporate income tax raises the funds available to the
providers of both debt and equity capital. If the rate of interest remained
unchanged, all of the corporate tax reduction would accrue to the provid-
Appendix B of this paper presents an explicit algebraic statement of this section and a
derivation of the effect of changes in personal and corporate tax rates on the pre-tax rate of
interest.
6 The analysis also simplifies by ignoring the special tax rules that now apply to pensions
and individual retirement accounts. For many taxpayers and for a much larger share of net
investment income, this can be justified by the fact that these are intramarginal transac-
tions. I return in section 6 to discuss this as well as the special tax rules that apply to the
interest paid on owner-occupied house mortgages.
This analysis assumes that all borrowing is done by corporate businesses and all lending
and portfolio equity investment is done by households.176Feldstein
ers of equity capital. That would of course mean that the return to equity
investors would increase relative to the return to the providers of debt.
In practice, such a shift in relative returns is unlikely, since bondholders
would then want to shift out of bonds and into equities, thus raising the
interest rates on bonds and reducing the yield on equities. A sensible
analysis must therefore recognize that eliminating the corporate tax
would, with a fixed capital stock and therefore a fixed marginal product
of capital, raise the returns on both debt and equity.
The relation between the interest rate and the equity return depends
on the preferences of portfolio investors who hold debt and equity and
on the preferences of firms that issue debt and equity capital. Rather
than develop an explicit model of these preferences and the resulting
market equilibrium, I consider two limiting cases. In the first case, the
relation between debt and equity yields depends solely on the prefer-
ences of households. In effect, the households are willing to hold debt
and equity if and only if they receive a fixed equity premium between
the households' return on equity (net of the personal tax rate)8 and the
corresponding rate of interest net of the personal tax rate. The alterna-
tive extreme assumption is that the gap between the equity yield and the
rate of interest is determined solely by the preferences of firms. In this
case, the firms supply relative quantities of debt and equity to keep a
fixed difference between the cost to the firms of equity capital and debt
capital, taking into account the fact that interest payments (but not pay-
ments to equity owners) are deductible against the corporate tax rate.
This section examines the implications of assuming that household pref-
erences determine the equity premium; while section 3 returns to exam-
ine the implications of assuming that the relative equity and debt yields
depend on corporate preferences.
The basic reason that a shift to a consumption tax raises the rate of
interest is that eliminating the corporate tax reduces the tax on corporate
profits. Since interest payments are fully deductible in calculating the
corporate profits tax liability, there is no direct effect of a change in the
corporate tax on the rate of interest. Indeed, if the only source of finance
for marginal investments were debt, changing or eliminating the corpo-
rate tax would have no effect at all on the rate of interest. But if incremen-
tal investments are financed by a mixture of debt and equity, the reduced
tax on corporate profits would increase the return on equity. If the return
on debt remained unchanged, the equity premium would widen inappro-
priately. The actual outcome is therefore an increase in both the equity
yield and the pre-tax interest rates in a way that maintains the original
8 This ignores the special tax treatment of capital gains; I return to that in section 4.Consumption Tax and Interest Rates177
equity premium. In addition, elimination of the personal tax on invest-
ment income widens the net equity premium, requiring a further rise in
the rate of interest to maintain the same net equity premium.
The magnitude of the rise in the interest rate in this simplified model
is quite large. Consider the following realistic parameter values: a corpo-
rate tax rate of 35 percent, a personal tax rate on investment income of 30
percent, a real marginal product of capital of 10 percent, a debt-to-capital
ratio of 40 percent, and an initial interest rate of 4 percent. With these
assumptions, the analysis implies that shifting to a consumption tax
(i.e., eliminating completely both the personal and the corporate income
taxes) nearly doubles the long-run real interest rate, increasing it from 4
to 7.9 percent.9
Since the shift to the consumption tax would eliminate the personal as
well as the corporate income tax, the rate of interest net of the personal
tax would rise even more. It can be shown that with the specific numeri-
cal values of the previous paragraph, the real net interest rate would rise
from 4 percent to 10 percent, i.e., the interest rate would equal the real
marginal product of capital. Since the interest rate would be raised to 7.9
percent by eliminating the corporate tax alone, less than half of the rise
in the real net return from 4 percent to 10 percent is due to the direct
effect of eliminating the personal tax on investment income. If however
the corporate tax were retained at 35 percent while the personal tax on
interest and dividends is eliminated, the real net return would rise from
4 percent to 7.2 percent.
Before considering alternative assumptions, including the alternative
equity premium assumption and implication of a positive initial rate of
inflation, I extend the analysis to consider how the likely response of
savings to the increased net interest rate would change the equilibrium
capital stock and therefore the pre-tax rate of interest.
2. INTEREST-SENSITIVE SAVING AND THE
EQUILIBRIUM INTEREST RATE
Although the assumption of a fixed capital stock and therefore of a
constant marginal product of capital may be a reasonable approximation
in the short run, the very long-run equilibrium wifi reflect the effect of
the consumption tax on the rate of saving and therefore on the equilib-
rium capital stock and the associated marginal product of capital.1° This
With those parameter values, the implied equity premium is 3.57 percent.
10 Even in the short run before the capital stock has changed, the anticipation of these
long-run changes in capital intensity would affect long-term interest rates and asset prices.178Feldstein
section discusses why the shift from an income tax to a consumption tax
would raise the long-run equilibrium pre-tax rate of interest under the
assumptions of section 1 even if savings respond positively to the higher
net interest rate unless the saving response is much greater than sug-
gested by previous research.
The link between the marginal product of capital and the saving rate
depends on two things: (1) how changes in the saving rate change the
capitalincome ratio of the economy and (2) how changes in the capital
income ratio alter the marginal product of capital. Consider first the link
between the saving rate and the capitalincome ratio. In a growing
economy, the capital stock per dollar of national income remains con-
stant if the gross saving rate is just enough to provide capital for the
increased labor force and to replace the capital that is being lost through
depreciation. This implies that a constant capitalincome ratio is equal to
the ratio of the gross saving rate to the sum of the depreciation rate and
the rate of labor-force growth. Since labor-force growth and depreciation
would not be altered by a change in tax policy, any tax-induced rise in
the gross saving rate would raise the long-run capitalincome ratio in
the same proportion.
The second link, i.e., between the capitalincome ratio and the mar-
ginal product of capital, depends on the production function for the
economy as a whole. The standard assumption of a CobbDouglas pro-
duction function implies that the share of investment income in national
income remains constant as the capitalincome ratio changes. Since in-
vestment income equals the marginal product of capital multiplied by
the capital stock, the share of investment income in national income is
the marginal product of capital multiplied by the ratio of capital to in-
come. Since the ratio of capital to income equals the ratio of the gross
saving rate to the fixed sum of depreciation and population growth, the
marginal product of capital varies inversely with the saving rate.11
With the parameter values presented at the end of section 1, this
implies that the pre-tax rate of interest declines only if the shift from an
income tax to a consumption tax causes the gross saving rate to rise by
more than 60 percent. This would imply that the gross saving rate rises
from 20 percent to 33 percent. To put this increase in perspective, note
that the gross saving rate in the United States averaged 19 percent of
GDP from 1970 to 1992, while the gross saving rate in Japan during those
years averaged 32 percent.
In notation that will be obvious to economists, the Cobb-Douglas production function
y = ak impliesf' = aak1. With the equilibrium growth condition cy = gk, it follows that
f' = ag/oConsumption Tax and Interest Rates179
Although a large enough increase in the return to saving might conceiv-
ably induce such an increase, the condition that the pre-tax rate of interest
does not increase implies that the overall rise in the reward to saving is
relatively small. Using the parameter assumptions introduced in the previ-
ous section implies that switching to a consumption tax would causethe
real net return to savers to rise from 4.9 percent to at most 6.1 percent if the
pre-tax rate of interest did not rise. A 60-percent rise in the saving rate in
response to a 1.2-percentage-point increase in the rate of return is much
greater than implied by previous research on the sensitivity of saving to
the net rate of return.12 With a saving increase of less than 60 percent
when the pre-tax interest rate is unchanged, it follows that the shift to a
consumption tax would raise the rate of interest.
Even if the gross saving rate increased by a very substantial 30 percent
(from 0.20 to 0.26), the pre-tax rate of interest would rise from an initial 4
percent to 5.5 percent.
3. AN ALTERNATIVE RELATION BETWEEN DEBT
AND EQUITY YIELDS
The analysis of sections 1 and 2 assumed that the relation between the
equity yield and the rate of interest is determined by the preferences of
households alone. In order to bracket the outcome that would reflect the
interaction of the preferences of investors and of firms, the current sec-
tion discusses the implications of the extreme alternative assumption
that the relation between the equity yield and the rate of interest is
determined by the preferences of the firms alone.
The cost of equity capital to the firm is the pre-tax cost of equity (i.e.,
the firm gets no deduction for payments made to shareholders), while
the cost of debt capital to the firm is the interest rate net of the deduction
at the corporate rate.13 Thus, with a fixed capitalincome ratio and there-
fore a fixed marginal product of capital (as in section 1), the alternative
assumption about the long-run relation between debt and equity returns
does not alter the conclusion that eliminating the corporate tax would
raise the rate of interest and, in particular, that eliminating the corporate
tax in the process of switching to a consumption tax would cause the rate
of interest to increase from 4 to 6.1 percent. Although this is less than the
12See among others Boskin (1978), Hail (1987), and the discussion in Feldstein (1995a).
13The parameter values presented at the end of section 2 imply that the equity premium as
viewed by the firm is 6.5 percent; i.e., the firm is willing to pay 6.5 percent more on equity
capital than its net-of-tax cost of debt funds. This of course implies the same net equity
premium of 3.57 percent for the individual investor.180Feldstein
increase to 7.9 percent if consumers' preferences determine the out-
come, it is still a significant rise.
If the saving rate responds to a rise in the net rate of return, calcula-
tions similar to those discussed in section 3 imply that the pre-tax rate of
interest would rise unless the gross saving rate increases by at least 27
percent. Although this is not as large as the increase required in the case
examined in section 2, it is still quite large relative to the increased net
return to savers.
More specifically, eliminating the corporate and personal taxes on in-
vestment income would cause the real net return to savers to rise from 4.9
to 7.9 percent even if the real pre-tax interest rate remained unchanged at
4 percent. This is substantially larger than the 1.2-percentage-point in-
crease in the net return implied by the alternative model of capital market
equilibrium in section 2. If this 3.0-percentage-point rise in the net rate of
return were to raise the gross saving rate by 27 percent (e.g., from 20
percent to 25.4 percent), the shift to a consumption tax with this section's
mode of capital-market equilibrium would lead to a lower equffibrium
pre-tax rate of interest.
4. INFLATION, CONSUMPTION TAXES, AND THE
RATE OF INTEREST
To permit a clearer exposition, the analysis until now has assumed that
there is no inflation and that tax depreciation is equal to economic depre-
ciation. This section presents numerical results for a more complete
specification that incorporates a positive rate of inflation and a more
realistic analysis of tax depreciation.
The interaction between inflation and tax rules is important because
the personal and business income taxes are based on nominal interest
income and expenses, on nominal capital gains, and on nominal depre-
ciation.14 In this more realistic analysis, the nominal return that the firm
can give to the providers of debt and equity capital (per unit of capital
before personal taxes) is the sum of three components: the real marginal
product of capital plus the rise in the nominal value of the capital stock
minus the tax paid by the corporations. The corporate tax base is now
the sum of four components: (1) the marginal product of capital, (2) the
value of accelerated depreciation per unit of capital, (3) the reduced
depreciation allowance caused by inflation, and (4) the deduction for the
nominal interest payments.
14See Feldstein (1983) for several papers on the interaction of inflation and tax rules.Consumption Tax and Interest Rates181
Because the individual provider of debt capital pays tax on the nomi-
nal rate of interest, the real net-of-tax rate of interest is the net-of-tax
nominal interest rate minus the rate of inflation. The equity investor
receives a total pre-tax nominal return per unit of equity capital that
reflects the payout of real earnings plus the inflationary appreciation of
the capital stock.15 This appreciation is taxed only on a deferred basis
and only if realized, while the remaining return to equity capital is sub-
ject to tax at the personal income tax rate.
Consider now the effect of going to a consumption tax in this more
realistic context (and with the assumption of sections 1 and 2 that the
equity premium is determined by the preferences of individual inves-
tors.) Inflation is important because inflation raises the effective tax rate
at the corporate level; this occurs because the historic-cost method of
calculating depreciation reduces the real present value of depreciation
when there is inflation. Eliminating the corporate income tax therefore
raises net-of-tax profits more when there is inflation.
In contrast, a positive rate of inflation makes the pre-tax nominal
interest rate less sensitive to changes in the personal-income-tax rate.
This effect of inflation occurs because inflation reduces the net yield on
equities by introducing a tax on nominal capital gains. Market equilib-
rium therefore requires that the net yield on fixed-income securities also
decline because of inflation. This effect could even theoretically imply
that eliminating the taxation of personal interest income could lower the
rate of interest.
Despite this theoretical ambiguity caused by the opposite effects of
eliminating the corporate and personal income taxes, realistic numerical
values indicate that switching to a consumption tax would cause a larger
increase in the real pre-tax interest rate when there is inflation. In addi-
tion to the assumptions of section 1, let the rate of inflation be 4 percent.
Although the effect of inflation on the real rate of interest is ambiguous
in an economy with a complex set of non-neutral tax rules, the evidence
suggests that these effects interact in practice in a way that keeps the real
pre-tax rate of interest approximately unchanged when the rate of infla-
tion changes.16 With the real rate of interest unchanged at 4 percent, the
initial value of the nominal interest rate is 8 percent. Assume also that in
the absence of inflation there is accelerated depreciation that is equiva-
lent to adding 1 percent to the pre-tax rate of return and that the historic-
cost method of depreciation causes each percentage point of inflation to
15 This assumes that there are no retained earnings.
16 See e.g., Feldstein (1983) and Mishkin (1992).182Feldstein
reduce net profits per unit of capital by 0.2 percent.17 Finally, I shall
assume that each dollar of accrued capital gain only raises the present
value of future taxes by one-fourth of the statutory personal tax rate, a
reflection of the deferral, the stepped-up basis at death, and the lower
statutory tax rate on capital gains than on other capital income.
These values imply that eliminating the personal income tax on invest-
ment income would have a smaller effect on the equilibrium interest rate
than in the previous case: shifting from the current tax system to a
consumption tax raises the real interest rate from 4 to 6.9 percent.18
Before considering the effect of an endogenous capital stock, consider
the alternative capital market equilibrium in which the real cost of equity
capital to the firm exceeds the real net cost of debt capital by a constant
differential. In this case, shifting from the existing tax sfructure to a
consumption tax would raise the real interest rate from 4 to 5.2 percent.
Comparing this with the result with the alternative capital market equilib-
rium implies that, with a fixed capital stock, the rise in the real interest
rate is from 4 percent to between 5.2 and 6.9 percent.
5. INFLATION AND SAVING
The results of section 4 can be extended to an economy in which the
saving rate responds to the real return to savers (by combining the
analyses of sections 2 and 4 and sections 3 and 4.)
The analysis of section 4 for the case in which the equity premium
reflects individuals' preferences showed that shifting from the current
tax rules to a consumption tax implies that the real interest rate would
rise from 4 to 6.9 percent if the capital intensity is fixed (i.e., with no
change in saving). To offset this and keep the interest rate from rising
requires (with the parameter values used in the previous section) the
gross saving rate to increase by 41 percent.
With a fixed nominal interest rate of 8 percent, shifting to a consump-
tion tax would raise the real net rate of return by 2.4 percentage points,
from 4.7 to 7.1 percent. If this rise in the net rate of return is enough to in-
crease gross saving by 41 percent, the pre-tax interest rate would decline.
Finally, there is a similar analysis with the risk premium based on the
17See Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski (1978) for analytic discussions of the effect of
inflation on the value of depreciation allowances. The number 0.2 used in the text is based
on the calculation by Alan Auerbach presented in his appendix to that paper.
As an alternative to the assumption that inflation does not alter the real pre-tax interest
rate, I have also considered the implication of keeping the equity premium unchanged at
the value implied by zero inflation. With this assumption, shifting to a consumption tax
implies that the real interest rate rises from 0.058 to 0.076.Consumption Tax and Interest Rates183
firms' preferences. This is the case most favorable to the conclusion that
shifting to a consumption tax would cause the pre-tax return to fall. In
this case, the numerical values that we have been assuming imply that
the real interest rate would rise from 4 to 5.2 percent if the saving rate is
unchanged and would decline if the gross saving rate rises by at least 13
percent. With a 13-percent increase in gross saving, the shift to a con-
sumption tax would leave the pre-tax interest rate unchanged but would
cause the real net return to savers to rise from 4.7 to 8.8 percent.This
combination is more plausible than the larger saving responses required
under the alternative market equilibrium conditions and inflation as-
sumptions discussed above.
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The analysis in this paper has used very simple models of business
borrowers and household portfolio investors. In reality there are several
other types of borrowers and investors in quite different tax situations.
The actual change in the interest rate wifi depend on their role in the
overall capital market equilibrium.
There are five primary participants in the capital market other than the
corporate borrowers and taxable portfolio investors that have been the
focus of the current analysis: household mortgage borrowers; the federal
government; foreign borrowers and investors; tax-exempt portfolio in-
vestors; and state and local government borrowers. Although incorporat-
ing these in a formal analysis lies beyond the scope of the current paper,
some brief comments on their likely effect on theequilibrium interest
rate can be made.
Household mortgage borrowing is now tax-deductible, increasing the
demand for mortgage credit and diverting capital from the business
sector to owner-occupied housing. Eliminating the income taxwould
remove this incentive to overinvest in such housing.With more of the
capital stock in business plant and equipment, the marginal product of
capital in that sector would decline, leading to a lower interest rate.19
The federal government is an intramarginal borrower that is clearly
not directly sensitive to changes in tax rates and that can be assumed to
be insensitive to changes in interest rates. The presence of government
bonds should therefore not alter the basic effect of the tax change dis-
cussed in this paper.
19Feldstein (1995b) showed that with plausible parameters to describe housing demand
the interest rate would still rise unless a 2.4-percent rise in the real interest rate is sufficient
to induce an increase in saving equal to 2.2 percent of GDP.184Feldstein
Foreign borrowers and investors who are not subject to U.S. tax rules
would dampen the magnitude of any interest-rate change. If capital
moved among national capital markets to equalize real rates of return,
there could be no response of U.S. real interest rates to the change in tax
rules. Instead of a rise in the rate of interest, capital would flow into the
United States, depressing the pre-tax marginal product of capital until
the equilibrium U.S. interest rate was at the world level. In practice,
capital movements are more limited, and an increased demand for corpo-
rate capital in the United States would be expected to change the level of
U.S. interest rates.2°
A large fraction of bonds are held by pension funds and other tax-
exempt portfolio investors. For them, the shift to a consumption tax
would involve no change in tax rates. Even if all portfolio investors were
tax-exempt, eliminating the corporate tax would lead to a rise in the rate
of interest. The return to tax-exempt investors would therefore rise even
though they are not directly affected by the change in tax rules.
State and local government bonds are currently untaxed. Under a
consumption tax they would lose their favored status, since no interest
income would be taxed. Interest rates on these obligations would there-
fore rise relative to other interest rates. To the extent that state and local
government borrowing is interest-sensitive, this would reduce the de-
mand for credit and therefore reduce the overall rise in interest rates.
Although it would be useful to have a formal analysis with this
broader class of borrowers and lenders, it appears from this informal
discussion that doing so would not alter the basic conclusion that shift-
ing to a consumption tax is likely to raise pre-tax interest rates.
APPENDIX A: THE EQUIVALENCE OF ALTERNATIVE
CONSUMPTION TAXES
Two seemingly different types of individual consumption taxes are now
being discussed.21 The consumed-income tax permits a deduction for all
net saving but continues to include investment income in the individ-
ual's tax base. The alternative consumption-type tax has no deduction
20On the limited net movement of capital among national capital markets, see the substan-
tial literature cited in Mussa and Goldstein (1993) and Feldstein (1994). See also Hartman
(1979) for a discussion of tax-induced international capital arbitrage.
21J use the term "individual consumption tax" to refer to taxes based on returns filed by
individuals. The other consumption taxes, collected from producers or sellers, are the VAT
and the national retail sales tax.
A proposal of this type has been made by Senators Pete Domenici and Sam Nunn; see
"USA Tax System" (Nunn and Domenici, 1995). An earlier and somewhat different form ofConsumption Tax and Interest Rates185
for saving but excludes investment income from the tax base. Although
these appear to be conceptually quite different, once a transition phase is
completed they are exactly equivalent in the sense that they define the
same lifetime budget constraint for eachindividual.24
To show this equivalence of the two types of taxes, I wifi look first at a
consumed-income tax under which the individual deducts net saving in
calculating the tax base. Consider how such a tax works in a simple life-
cycle model in which the individual earns a fixed amount in the first
period of his life and retires in the second period. The individual earns
wage income W in the first period and chooses to save anamount S. If
the tax rate is t, the tax paid at that time is t(W S) and first-period
consumption is therefore C1 = (1t) (WS). The savings earn a rate of
return of R and therefore grow to (1 +R)S by the secondperiod. In that
second period the individual pays tax on the dissaved original principle
S as well as on the investment income RS. Second-period consumption
is therefore C2 = (lt) (l+R)S. Simple algebra implies that C1 =(lt)
(WS) can be rewritten as (lt)S = (lt)W - C1. The relation between
consumption in the second period and consumption in the first period-
i.e., the individual's lifetime budget constraint with a consumedincome
taxcan therefore be written
C2 = (1+R)[(1t)WC1}. (A.1)
Consider now a tax system in which there is no special treatment of
savings per se but in which the interest and dividends earned on savings
are untaxed. The first-period tax istherefore tW, and the savings are
(1t)WC1. Since there is no tax on the return to that saving, the
second-period consumption is again given by
C2= (l+R)[(1t)WC1]. (A.2)
a consumed-income tax is discussed in U.S. Treasury(1977) and in Bradford (1986). The
idea of such a consumed-income tax among economists goes back at least toKaldor (1955).
A pure value-added tax or national retail sales tax would also have the effect ofexcluding
net saving; they are discussed later in this appendix.
Congressman Richard Armey has recently proposed such a tax based on the collection
mechanism described in Hall and Rabushka (1995). The Armey tax collects a fixed fraction
of wages and salaries above a deductible amount from individuals through withholding or
subsequent direct payments. The same fraction of all nonwage compensation paid by firms
(i.e., firing benefits, deferred compensation, etc.) is collected directly from the firms.
24 Transition rules in the consumed-income tax that avoid taxing the dissaving of amounts
accumulated under the existing income-tax system could make the two systems similar
from the start. The long-run equivalence assumes that the two systems haveequivalent
untaxed excluded amounts and that the tax rate in each system remains unchanged during
the individual's life.186Feldstein
This establishes that each individual's lifetime budget constraint is
exactly the same under both taxes. The individual wifi therefore choose
the same path of consumption. Since the pre-tax income and consump-
tion are the same, the value of the taxes is also the same.
The intuition for the equivalence is clear: the savings deduction in the
consumed-income tax is really only a postponement of tax, since the
dissaving must be included in retirement income and the advantage of
the postponement is offset (relative to the interest exclusion rule) by
taxing the interest on the saving.
A third type of consumption tax, a consumption value-added tax or
national retail sales tax, is really a variant on the first of the two consump-
tion taxes described above and therefore equivalent also to the second
type of consumption tax. With such a VAT, individuals who have real
consumption of C1 spend (1 +v)C1, where v is the rate of value-added tax
or retail sales tax. If the individuals earn W, their saving is given by S =
W(1+v)C1. The saving provides funds available for spending on
second-period consumption equal to (1 +R)S. But since that consump-
tion in the second period is also subject to a value-added tax at rate v, the
actual second-period consumption C2 satisfies (1 +v)C2 = (1 +R)S, or
(1+v)C2=(1+R)[W(1+v)C1J. Dividing both sides by 1+v yields
C2= (1+R)[(1+v)WC1]. (A.3)
If the VAT rate v is selected so that (1+v)= 1t, equation (A.3)
defines the same lifetime budget constraint as equations (A.1) and
(A.2). More generally, adding a value-added tax or a national retail
sales tax to the direct personal consumption tax does not alter the
lifetime budget constraint.
The text of the paper therefore refers to the effect of a "consumption tax"
without distinguishing between the different types of consumption taxes.
APPENDIX B: THE EFFECT OF SHIFTING TO A
CONSUMPTION TAX WITH A FIXED CAPITAL STOCK
This appendix provides a formal statement of the analysis described in
section 1 of the text. It shows how the equilibrium pre-tax rate of interest
and the net rate of return to savers would respond to changes in the
personal tax rate and the corporate tax rate in an economy with a fixed
This simplifies by assuming that all consumption is included in the VAT base. In practice,
most countries with value-added taxes exclude certain types of consumption (e.g., medical
care, education, some types of food, housing) or tax them at lower rates. See Feldstein and
Krugman (1990) for a discussion of the implication of this in an open economy.Consumption Tax and Interest Rates187
stock of capital and a zero rate of inflation. The fixed capital stock in this
one-sector economy implies that the corporate borrowers earn a fixed
pre-tax marginal product of capital,f'.26 A fraction b of capital is debt on
which the firm pays an interest rate of i. The equity investors receive a
return of e per dollar of equity capital. If the corporate tax rate is T, the
firm's budget constraint is given by
(li-)f' = (l-T)bi + (lb)e. (B.1)
This reflects the fact that the interest payments are deductible in calculat-
ing taxable profits while the return to equity investors is not.27
If the representative individual has marginal tax rate 0, that individ-
ual's net return is28
r.4 = (1O)[bi + (lb)e}. (B.2)
The relation between the interest rate and the equity return depends on
the preferences of portfolio investors who hold debt and equity and on the
preferences of firms that issue debt and equity capital. Rather than de-
velop an explicit model of these preferences and the resulting market
equilibrium, I consider two limiting cases. In the first case, the relation be-
tween debt and equity yields depends solely on the preferences of house-
holds. In effect, the relative demand for debt and for equity are infinitely
elastic at a fixed equity premium, 4), between the households' net-of-tax
return on equity and the corresponding net-of-tax rate of interest:
(1-0)e = (1-0)i +4) (B.3a)
The alternative extreme assumption is that the gap between the equity
yield and the rate of interest is determined solely by the preferences of
firms. In this case, the relative supplies of debt and equity are infinitely
elastic at a fixed equity premium, tfi, between the firms' net-of-tax cost of
equity and debt capital:
e = (lT)i + i/i. (B.3b)
This analysis assumes that all borrowing is done by corporate businesses and all lending
and portfolio equity investment is done by households.
Assuming that the marginal product of capital is taxed at the same statutory rate that
applies to interest deductions implicitly assumes that economic depreciation is allowed for
tax purposes. This is discussed further in the text of the paper.
This ignores the special tax treatment of capital gains. This is discussed further in the
text of the paper.188Feldstein
Note that equations (B.3a) and B.3b) differ not only in the tax that is
relevant but also in the fact that both equity and debt are taxed to
portfolio investors while the corporate tax deduction applies only to the
interest payments.
This appendix examines the implications of assuming that household
preferences determine the equity premium [equation (B.3a)], whereas
section 3 of the main text (and the corresponding section of the working
paper) returns to examine the implications of assuming that the relative
equity and debt yields depend on corporate preferences [equation (B.3b)J.
Combining (B.l) and (B.3a) and differentiating with respect to T, 0,
and i yields







Sincef' - bi> 0 and 1Tb> 0, it follows that di/dT <0, so that a reduction
of the corporate tax rate causes the pre-tax interest rate to rise. Similarly, b
<1 and 0 < limply di Id 0 < 0, so that a reduction of the personal tax on
investment income also raises the pre-tax interest rate. Since the shift to a
consumption tax would eliminate the corporate tax (dT = - T) and the
personal tax on investment income (dO = - 0), it would raise the rate of
interestbydi = [(f' bir+ (1b)4)(lO)20] 1(1Tb).
To understand why this shift to a consumption tax raises the rate of
interest, note first that reducing or eliminating the corporate tax reduces
the tax on corporate profits (f' bi) directly. Since interest payments are
fully deductible, there is no direct effect of a change in TOn j29 But if the
reduced tax on corporate profits were allowed to increase the return on
equity while the return on debt remained unchanged, the equity pre-
mium would widen inappropriately. The actual outcome is therefore an
increase in both e and i in a way that maintains the original equity
Note that with 160-percent debt finance at the margin (i.e., with b = 1), equation (1)
becomes (1r)f' = (1T)i and a change in Thas no effect on i.Consumption Tax and Interest Rates189
premium. In addition, the elimination of the personal tax on investment
income widens the net equity premium, requiring a further rise in the
rate of interest to maintain the same net equity premium.
The large magnitude of the rise in the interest rate in this simplified
model is discussed in section 1 of the text of the paper.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The effects of tax reform on corporate financial decisions help determine
whether reform wifi increase capital formation and simplify the tax sys-
tem. This paper describes the effects of fundamental tax reform on
corporate tax planning and summarizes economists' knowledge of the
magnitude of these effects. We analyze both income tax reform, consist-
ing of integrating the corporate and personal income taxes, and moving
to a broad-based consumption tax. As prototypes of reform, we use the
U.S. Treasury's comprehensive business income tax proposal for in-
come tax reform and the flat tax for consumption tax reform. The critical
difference between these reforms is that the consumption tax gives
firms immediate deductions for capital outlays instead of the deprecia-
tion allowances of the income tax.
Tax reform can affect business organizational form, capital structure,
and timing decisions. Our major theme is that the two types of reform wifi
have similar effects on business financial decisions because they both in-
tegrate corporate and personal income taxes. Both reforms eliminate the
tax differentials between corporate and noncorporate businesses and be-
tween debt and equity financing. Since both reforms eliminate investor-
We are grateful to David Bradford, Robert Hall, and Laura Kalambokidis, participants in
the NBER Conference on Asset Price and Transition Effects of Consumption Tax Reform,
and seminar participants at Columbia, Georgetown Law School, Tufts, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia, and the American Enterprise Institute for helpful comments and
suggestions, and to James Combs for excellent research assistance.192Gentry &Hubbard
level taxes on financial assets, they reduce the effects of taxes on timing
decisions associated with financial assets, such as the timing of corporate
dividends. Assumptions about how taxes affect these various financial
decisions have important implications for the incidence of the corporate
tax. These reforms also greatly alter the current incentives for tax-
motivated financial planning.
1. INTRODUCTION
Proponents of fundamental tax reform in the United States claim that tax
reform would increase saving and investment (see, e.g., the analysis in
Auerbach, 1996) and create a simpler tax system (see, e.g., the analysis
in Slemrod and Bakija, 1996). Both of these claims depend on how re-
form would change the tax treatment of business organization and fi-
nancing decisions. These decisions help determine the allocative and
efficiency consequences of capital taxation, an important input for ana-
lyzing the effects of tax reform on saving and investment. For example,
if borrowing is the marginal source of funds, Stiglitz (1973) concludes
that the corporate income tax is a nondistortionary tax on economic
profit that does not change the rate of return to capital; in contrast,
general equilibrium models of the corporate income tax, starting with
Harberger (1962), typically assume equity-financed investment and find
that the corporate income tax lowers the rate of return to capital. Regard-
ing tax simplification, much of the current tax system's complexity arises
from taxing capital income; hence whether reform can simplify the tax
system depends on its effects on the tax incentives for financial plan-
ning. In this paper, we describe the major effect of fundamental tax
reform on corporate tax planning and summarize economists' knowl-
edge of the magnitude of these different effects.
"Fundamental tax reform" is a broad term that encompasses a wide
range of policies, including income-tax reforms and replacing the current
tax system with a broad-based consumption tax. Despite this range of
policies, possible reforms have several common features. First, a com-
mon goal of tax reforms is to reduce the disparity in tax rates across
different types of real assets and across different financial contracts.
Second, fundamental tax reforms of both the income and consumption
variety typically call for a broader tax base with lower marginal tax rates.
For income- tax reform, our definition of fundamental tax reform in-
cludes proposals to integrate the personal and corporate tax systems and
move toward a more consistent definition of income across types of
assets. Moving to a consumption tax can be thought of as taking such an
income-tax reform one step furtherthe consumption tax would replaceTax Reform and Corporate Financial Policy193
the system of depreciation allowances under the integrated income tax
with immediate deductions for capital outlays of businesses. A major
theme of our analysis is that since the two reforms share this first step,
many of their effects on corporate financing decisions are similar.
We identify two major areas of policy concern. First, available evi-
dence on the importance of financing and organizational distortions
suggest efficiency gains from fundamental income- or consumption-tax
reform. Second, fundamental tax reform could greatly alter the tax-
planning landscape, which would impact the complex financial transac-
tions (e.g., derivatives and swap contracts) that firms use to lower their
tax payments under current tax rules.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes tax planning under
the current tax system. Section 3 briefly outlines prototypes for tax re-
form and their treatment of the business sector and financial assets.
Sections 4-6 evaluate distortions of organizational form, capital struc-
ture, and timing, respectively. Section 7 links assumptions about financ-
ing distortions with analyses of the incidence of the corporate tax. In
section 8, we evaluate likely tax planning opportunities in the aftermath
of tax reform. Section 9 concludes.
2. TAX PLANNING UNDER THE CURRENT
TAX SYSTEM
The current U.S. tax system is a hybrid of income- and consumption-tax
rules (see, e.g., the review in Engen and Gale, 1996). The reasons behind
the hybrid tax system include both administrative issues (e.g., difficul-
ties in measuring income accruing as unrealized capital gains or as con-
sumption flows from consumer-owned durables) and policy choices
(e.g., special tax provisions for retirement saving). As part of this hy-
brid, the United States has a classical corporate income tax. This system
taxes corporate income twice, once at the entity level and again at the
investor level.
The classical corporate tax and the hybrid of consumption-tax and
income-tax rules create incentives for firms to minimize their tax liabifi-
ties through financial planning. Specifically, these incentives include
discouraging incorporation, encouraging borrowing (since the interest
payments on debt-financed corporate investment are tax-deductible),
and altering the timing of transactions (including the payment of divi-
dends and the sale of assets). In sections 4-6, we provide more details
on these incentives and how fundamental tax reform would affect them.
While firms sometimes respond to tax incentives by changing their194Gentry & Hubbard
financial plans, firms also creatively design contracts to get the tax bene-
fits of a decision without incurring all of the associated non-tax costs. For
example, firms write contracts that blur the non-tax distinction between
debt and equity but qualify for interest deductions for tax purposes.
Such financial "engineering" challenges the tax authorities to distin-
guish between different contracts. This cycle of financial innovation and
regullation increases the complexity of the tax system. Furthermore, if
firms differ in their access to these techniques, then this planning creates
unintended distortions across firms. In the sections on organizational
form, capital structure, and timing, we illustrate how the tax system
encourages financial innovation.
Before describing the impact of potential tax reforms on tax planning,
we review how the current system creates tax planning opportunities.
The returns to tax planning depend both on the level of tax rates and on
the dispersion of tax rates across investors or assets. Higher tax rates
increase the returns to arranging financial contracts to minimize taxable
income. Tax rate differentialsacross investors and across different
types of incomeplay a crucial role in tax planning. The simplest tax
rate differentials occur across investors. For example, with progressive
taxation, marginal income-tax rates rise with income. In addition, tax-
able investors and tax-exempt investors, such as pension funds and not-
for-profit organizations, face different tax rates. These differentials often
reflect policy decisions that tax rates should vary depending on the
ownership of income. Tax rate differentials across investors create incen-
tives for investors with positive income trying to be classified as having a
lower tax rate and investors with negative income trying to be classified
as having a higher tax rate. For example, parents (corporations) with
high marginal tax rates may try to shift income to their children (uncon-
solidated subsidiaries or pension funds) who face a lower marginal tax
rate.
Stronger tax incentives occur when these tax rate differentials across
investors are combined with tax differences across types of income or
assets. The tax system has a myriad of distinctions among types of
income and assets. Income can either be ordinary (e.g., wages, interest,
or dividends) or capital (e.g., capital gains). Some investors face lower
tax rates on capital gains than ordinary income. The timing of tax pay-
ments may also differ because some capital income is taxed on realiza-
tion rather than accrual. Examples of how tax rules vary across assets
include: depreciation schedules for cost recovery, rules to differentiate
equity from debt, and rules applying to original issue debt to determine
the accrual of interest income and deductions. These tax rules often rely
inherently on arbitrary judgments. The rules for financial transactionsTax Reform and Corporate Financial Policy195
are particularly difficult to design because a set of cash flows can be
produced by many different financial arrangements. Unless all of these
arrangements yield the same tax result, then taxpayers can choose the
financial arrangement that minimizes their tax burdens.
Combining the tax rate differences across assets and investors creates
clientele-based tax planning opportunities and, in some cases, the possi-
bility of tax arbitrage. Investors with high tax rates are the natural clien-
tele for lightly-taxed forms of income (e.g., high-tax-rate investors own
municipal bonds) and investors with low tax rates tend towards highly-
taxed assets (e.g., pension funds own corporate bonds). In its extreme
form, tax planning leads to tax arbitrageinvestments in which firms
have a zero net position but earn income from the differential taxation of
the components of the transaction.
Financial-market innovation has facilitated more advanced forms of
tax planning.1 The flexibility inherent in financial assets simplifies split-
ting the returns on real assets to construct tax-motivated clienteles. De-
rivative securities and other complex transactions complicate defining
ownership of an asset. For example, the risk involved in owning a share
of stock can be undone by either selling the share, short-selling the
share, or writing an appropriate set of options on the share; however,
these three methods of disposing of risk are taxed differently.2 These
differences in the taxation of economically similar transactions create
arbitrage opportunities. Because the principal role of financial markets is
to make financial claims liquid and fungible, it is inherently difficult to
measure consistently the outcomes of these different transactions (see,
e.g., Weisbach, 1995). For physical assets, however, it is relatively easy
to assign ownership of the asset to an entity and measure the benefits
and costs of ownership.3 Whether tax reform can successfully reduce the
1 While the economics and finance literature has long recognized the role of complex
financial instruments in tax avoidance, the details of particular transactions are much more
developed in the tax-law literature. Recent examples from the legal literature on the gen-
eral issue of taxes and financial innovation include Kleinbard (1991), Shuldiner (1992),
Warren (1993), Strnad (1994), and Weisbach (1995).
2We are assuming that investors' portfolio choices are primarily motivated by risk and
return considerations rather than the other benefits (or burdens) of ownership, such as
voting and liabffity issues. Paul (1996) discusses the distinction between holding (versus
disposing) of an asset for tax purposes and hedging risk as a substitute for disposing of the
asset.
3 While it is easier to assign ownership to the returns to physical assets than the returns to
financial assets, some scope remains for tax planning with physical assets. Leases provide
opportunities to separate the physical use of an asset from its ownership for tax purposes.
However, as discussed below, the incentives for this tax planning are linked to disparities
in marginal tax rates that tax reform would reduce.196Gentry &Hubbard
incentives for tax planning depends on whether it can decrease the tax
rate differentials across investors and assets and lessen the scope for tax-
motivated financial innovation.
3. PROTOTYPES FOR FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM
Proposals for fundamental tax reform typically suggest moving to either
a more pure income tax or a more pure consumption tax. Although these
two proposals appear to be on opposite ends of a spectrum, the purer
income tax and the purer consumption tax may affect corporate financ-
ing decisions in similar ways. Moving to a purer tax system of either type
would reduce tax-planning opportunities because tax-minimizing strate-
gies often involve combining transactions with different tax treatments
(i.e., part of the transaction receives pure income-tax treatment, while
another part receives consumption-tax treatment) or by taking advan-
tages of disparities in tax rates across investors. Thus either reform re-
duces the tax rate differentials discussed in the previous section.
In the next subsection, we describe a prototype of income-tax reform.
We proceed to show how this income tax could be converted into a
consumption tax and argue that this conversion would not have major
implications for corporate finance issues. We conclude the section with
an outline of how we define fundamental tax reform for the remainder of
the paper.
3.1 Broad-Based Income-Tax Reform
For corporate financing decisions, the critical element of fundamental
reform of the income tax is the integration of the corporate and the
personal income-tax systems. In theory, integrating the systems would
eliminate two distortions from the current tax system. First, integration
would eliminate the distinction between corporate and noncorporate
businesses by abolishing the double taxation of corporate income. Sec-
ond, this reform would remove the differential taxation of debt and
equity financing. Whether the actual tax reform process would deliver
these benefits depends on the details of the new tax system.
The U.S. Treasury Department's recent study of corporate tax integra-
tion (see U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1992) presents several alterna-
tive approaches to integrating the individual and corporate tax systems.
Rather than repeat this discussion of the various proposals, we outline a
stylized version of one proposal, the comprehensive business income tax
(CBIT). The goal of CBIT is to tax business income once. CBIT is a
business-level tax on the return to capital of businesses. Broadly speak-
ing, the business-level tax base under CBIT is revenue from the sale ofTax Reform and Corporate Financial Policy197
goods or real assets less wages, material costs, and depreciation allow-
ances for capital investments. To conform to standard income account-
ing principles, the CBIT base uses depreciation allowances that follow as
closely as possible economic depreciation. Because CBIT includes a tax
on capital income, it runs afoul of the standard income-taxaccounting
problem of adjusting for inflation. To tax real, rather than nominal,
capital income, the cost recovery system (depreciation allowances) must
be indexed for inflation. CBIT does not distinguish whether investment
is financed by debt or equity. That is, in contrast with the current tax
system, CBIT would not allow businesses to deduct interest payments
from their tax base.4 Because CBIT taxes business income at the entity
level, there is no need for investor-level taxes on capital gains, interest,
or dividends received.5
CBIT can be thought of as the capital income tax component of a
broad-based income tax that collects taxes from labor income through a
household-level wage tax. We assume, for simplicity, that the marginal
tax rate jn CBIT is the same as the marginal wage tax rate. With this
assumption, capital and labor income face the same tax rate. If the wage
tax rate differs from the CBIT rate, then labor and capital income face
different tax rates; however, capital income from different types of assets
faces a common tax rate regardless of whether it is financed by debt or by
equity.6
3.2 Converting the Income Tax into a Consumption Tax
Converting CBIT into a consumption tax turns out to be quite straightfor-
ward. Instead of measuring business income through depreciation allow-
ances, a consumption-tax version of CBITwould allow businesses a
As with a consumption tax, this raises questions about how to tax financial intermediar-
ies. For suggestions, see U.S. Department of the Treasury (1992, Chapter 5) and Bradford
(1996).
Moving beyond the business sector, an important distinction between a pure income tax
(sometimes referred to as a "Haig-Simons" income tax) and the combination of CBIT and a
wage tax is that CBIT does not tax capital income earned outside ofbusiness entities.
Owner-occupied housing is the primary form of capital outside the reach of CBIT. While
this distinction is important for analyzing the efficiency of tax reform proposals (e.g., the
allocation of capital between housing and business uses) and the distribution of tax pay-
ments, it is less clear that this omission from the tax base greatly affects the corporate
finance issues surrounding tax reform.
6 If the household and business tax rates differ, then tax planning opportunities arise from
recharacterizing income as wage or capital income. This form of tax planning is especially
relevant for closely held businesses that have more leeway in substituting a lightly taxed
form of income for a more heavily taxed form of income. This type of tax planning is
probably less relevant for publicly held corporations; however, it could create some forms
of tax arbitrage for financial intermediaries.198Gentry & Hubbard
deduction for capital investments when assets are purchased. This ad-
justment converts the combination of CBIT and a wage tax into the flat
tax proposed by Hall and Rabushka (1983, 1995). We use the flat tax as
the model of the consumption tax for the purposes of this paper.7 Our
focus on expensing as the central difference between CBIT and the flat
tax reflects our emphasis on the effects of tax reform on business fi-
nance. The flat tax has an added advantage of mitigating the distortions
of capital allocation between the business and housing sectors. In the
aggregate, the tax base is a measure of consumption because sales be-
tween businesses induce offsetting inclusions and deductions for the
seller and buyer: the seller's tax base increases by the purchase price, but
the buyer's tax base decreases by the purchase price. If the buyer and
seller face the same tax rate, then the transaction creates no revenue for
the government. For business sales to households, the aggregate tax
base increases by the value of the sale.
Having described CBIT and the flat tax in this way, we can see that the
flat tax does not exempt all of what is commonly called "capital income"
from taxation (see also Gentry and Hubbard, 1997a). Under the business
cash-flow tax component of the flat tax, the present value of depreciation
allowances for one dollar of current investment is one dollar, while the
present value is less than one dollar under the income tax. For a risk-free
investment project, the tax savings from depreciation allowances repre-
sent risk-free flows,8 which the firm would discount at the risk-free rate
of interest. For a marginal investment (in which the expected rate of
return just equals the discount rate), the up-front subsidy to investment
provided by expensing equals the expected future tax payments. It is in
this sense that the "return to capital" is not taxed under a cash-flow tax
or a consumption tax.9
What about inframarginal investments? That is, in addition to risk-free
projects, suppose that certain entrepreneurs have access to investments
with inframarginal returns (associated with rents to ideas, managerial
skill, or market power). In this case, what is taxed is rates of cash flow in
Related issues arise in the discussion of consequences of other tax reform proposals. We
describe other recent proposals in Gentry and Hubbard (1997a); see also Slemrod and
Bakija (1996).
Here we are abstracting from tax-loss asymmetries.
Life-cycle simulation models used to evaluate tax reforms follow this intuition and gener-
ally assume one risk-free return on accumulated savings (see, e.g., Auerbach and
Kotlikoff, 1987; Hubbard and Judd, 1987; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995; and Engen
and Gale, 1996). In such models, the shift from an income tax to a consumption tax is
equivalent to forgiving the taxation of capital income from new saving and imposing a one-
time tax on existing saving used to finance consumption.Tax Reform and Corporate Financial Policy199
excess of the firm's discount rate for depreciation allowances. Cash
flows representing inframarginal returns are taxed equivalently under
the broad-based income tax and the cash-flow tax (or consumption tax).
As long as the scale of inframarginal projects is limited (and entrepre-
neurs' project selection is optimal), the tax saving from expensing
should be invested in another risk-free asset. Hence for inframarginal
projects only the return representing the risk-free rate is untaxed under
the cash-flow tax or consumption tax.
What about risky investments? First, risky investments generate ex
post high or low returns. The component of capital income that repre-
sents luck after a risky investment has been made can be treated like the
inframarginal return in the foregoing example of the income tax and the
cash flow tax. Second, risky investments have a higher ex ante required
rate of return than risk-free investments, reflecting a risk premium to
compensate savers for bearing risk. Whether either tax system levies a
tax on the risk premium depends on how one defines a "tax." If a tax is
defined as an increase in expected government revenue, then both the
income tax and the cash-flow tax include the risk premium. If, in con-
trast, a tax is an increase in the discounted present value of government
revenue, then neither tax system includes the risk premium. In either
case, the central point is that the stylized income tax and consumption
tax treat the return to risktaking similarly.
To summarize, what is often called the return to capital can be thought
of as the sum of the risk-free return (opportunity cost), inframarginal
returns (economic profits), and returns to risktaking (payment for bear-
ing risk and luck). In contrast to the base of the consumption tax, the
income tax includes the opportunity cost of capital, which equals the rate
of return on a marginal riskless project.
3.3 Working Definition of Tax Reform
For the remainder of the paper, we use the term "fundamental tax re-
form" to represent tax proposals with the following characteristics:
It is a combination of a business-level tax (with either cash flow or
business income as the base) and a household wage tax.
For an income-tax version of reform, we assume that depreciation
allowances are as close to economic depreciation as possible; for a
consumption-tax version of reform, businesses wifi deduct capital
expenditures.
The business-level tax does not distinguish between debt and equity
financing.
In order to minimize the differences in marginal tax rates across busi-200Gentry & Hubbard
ness entities and investments, firms carry net operating losses for-
ward with interest.10
5. There are lower marginal tax rates with a single marginal tax rate
across business entities and households; the household tax can have a
personal or family exemption.
Because fundamental tax reform implies either income-tax reform or
moving to a consumption tax, we will distinguish between effects on
corporate finance issues that do not depend on the choice of tax reforms
from effects that differ between the two reform proposals.
4. ORGANIZATIONAL-FORM DISTORTIONS
Traditional arguments for eliminating differential capital taxation have
focused on the distortions of business organizational form11 arising from
a classical corporate income tax. By taxing corporate equity income
twice, the classical corporate tax system discourages equity-financed in-
vestment by corporations. In addition, the corporate sector must earn a
higher pre-tax rate of profit to prevent capital from flowing to the
noncorporate sector. The tax distorts the allocation of resources by dis-
couraging the use of the corporate form even when incorporation would
provide non-tax benefitssuch as limited liability for the owners, cen-
tralized management, free transferability of interests, and continuity.
Since Harberger's (1962) seminal research, more sophisticated models
have been constructed to determine the costs of the economic distortions
caused by the corporate income tax (see the studies reviewed in Shoven
and Whalley, 1992, and U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1992). For
° The actual CBIT and flat-tax proposals do not include interest for tax-loss carryforwards.
These proposals would probably maintain something like the current tax rules that allow
limited carrybacks and carryforwards of current tax losses without an adjustment for the
time value of money. With such rules, effective tax rates can still vary across firms even
when all firms face the same statutory marginal tax rate. Hence these rules motivate
several tax planning strategies, including leasing and some forms of corporate reorganiza-
tion. These tax planning incentives would continue under tax reforms that retain such loss
offset rules.
11 We discuss tax-induced distortions in business organizations in Gentry and Hubbard
(199Th). In addition, because of our emphasis on corporate finance, we abstract from a
more general discussion of intersectoral and interasset distortions caused by the current
system of differential taxation of business capital income (see, e.g., Gravelle, 1981; Fuller-
ton and Henderson, 1987; and Auerbach, 1989). For the most part, removing such distor-
tions can be accomplished by fundamental income-tax reform in the form of CBIT (or the
spirit of the Tax Reform Act of 1986). Some additional improvements in allocational effi-
ciency are made possible by a consumption tax because of inflation non-neutralities in the
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example, Harberger's original model delineated only noncorporate and
corporate sectors; some researchers developed models with more sec-
toral detail.
More recently, models emphasizing shifts in the relative importance of
corporate and noncorporate producers within an industry have sug-
gested greater distortions under the corporate tax then suggested by
earlier approaches (see Gravelle and Kotlikoff, 1989). The additional cost
arises because corporate and noncorporate producers within an industry
possess differential advantages. Corporations may be better able to ex-
ploit scale economics, while noncorporate organizations may be better
able to encourage entrepreneurial skill. Distorting the choice between
these organizational forms thus means diminishing the use of scale
economies as well.
While such theoretical models as Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989) suggest
that the tax-induced distortion of organizational form could have sub-
stantial efficiency costs, recent empirical estimates by MacKie-Mason
and Gordon (1997) contradict these predictions. Using time-series data
from U.S. tax returns, MacKie-Mason and Gordon find that the differen-
tial taxation of corporate and noncorporate businesses has a modest (but
statistically significant) effect on the amount of assets and income in the
corporate form. For example, they estimate that a 10-percentage-point
decrease in the tax rate on noncorporate income would cause only 0.2
percent of total assets to shift out of the corporate form. Despite these
relatively small effects, the results of MacKie-Mason and Gordon imply
that the excess burden from distorting organizational-form choices
equals 16 percent of business tax revenue. One difficulty in measuring
the excess burden from this organizational-form distortion is that it re-
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istics, such as limited liability and access to public equity markets.
MacKie-Mason and Gordon focus on tax rate changes and organiza-
tional-form choices using data from 1959 to 1986. Their model only pre-
dicts about half of the observed shift in organizational form after the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). In addition to changing marginal tax rates
substantially, TRA86 also changed various tax rules, such as the general
utilities doctrine and passive-loss rules, that affect organizational-form
choices. Several responses to 1l'tA86 suggest that taxes do play an im-
portant role in organizational-form decisions. First, Nelson (1991) and
Poterba (1992) document the proliferation of S corporations which do
not face double taxation. Second, the rise of publicly-traded partnerships
in the mid-1980s and the subsequent tax reforms that legislated their
demise are another case study of how organizational form adapts to tax
law (see Gentry, 1994). Third, the increasing importance of limited-202Gentry &Hubbard
liabifity companies (LLCs) also attests to the incentives to avoid organiza-
tional forms with double taxation after TRA86 (see Hamill, 1996). In
summary, taxes appear to play an important role in organizational-form
choices for some firms (though not necessarily the largest public corpora-
tions), but the magnitude of this effect and the efficiency costs are diffi-
cult to measure.
The tax bias against corporate equity investment must be placed in the
context of other tax considerations (which we discuss in greater detail
below). For example, when the source of corporate equity investment is
retained earnings, rather than new share issues, then the funds for
investment are taxed at the corporate level and as capital gains to inves-
tors. At various times and in certain industries, the combination of the
corporate tax rate and the effective tax rate on capital gains has been
greater than, equal to, and less than the individual income-tax rate on
business income. In this way, differences among tax rates may reduce,
eliminate, or even reverse the bias against investment by corporations.
An additional mitigating factor is the use of debt financing; to the extent
that corporations finance investments through debt, the relative tax ad-
vantage for noncorporate businesses is reduced.
Switching from the current tax system to the flat tax would eliminate
the distortions of organizational form arising under the classical corpora-
tion income tax. This efficiency gainwhich some models summarized
in U.S. Department of the Treasury (1992) suggest is substantialis
accomplished, however, by integrating the corporate and individual in-
come tax systems. Hence fundamental income-tax reform would also
yield this gain, though the flat tax would also address the distortion in
the allocation of capital between owner-occupied housing and corporate
capital.
5. CAPITAL-STRUCTURE DISTORTIONS
In practice, the effect of the corporate tax distortion on debt-equity ratios
and on economic efficiency depends in part on the degree of substitut-
ability of debt and equity from a non-tax perspective. If, on the one
hand, firms consider debt and equity to be perfect substitutes in corpo-
rate finance, taxes wifi affect capital structure but wifi have no efficiency
consequences for the firm. If, on the other hand, capital structures are
completely determined by non-tax considerations, differential taxation
leads to differences in effective tax rates on capital among firms.
The general benchmark for analysis is the frictionless world of Modig-
liani and Miller (1958): with no taxation, no bankruptcy costs, and no
information problems, corporate financial policy is irrelevant. With bank-Tax Reform and Corporate Financial Policy203
ruptcy costs and corporate taxes, firms experience a trade-off at the
margin when raising additional debt financing between an increased
probability of incurring bankruptcy costs and the tax subsidy granted to
debt.
In general, both corporate and individual taxes (on ordinary income
and capital gains) matter for decisions about corporate capital structures.
While the corporate tax favors debt financing, the individual tax favors
equity financing. Although dividends and interest income are taxed simi-
larly in the individual tax, equity income received in the form of capital
gains is taxed at a lower effective rate on account of deferral (and, in
some periods, lower explicit tax rates).
With corporate and individual taxes, the net tax benefit to financing
through debt depends on individual tax rates on interest, dividends, and
capital gains, the corporate tax rate, and dividend policy. In particular,
for an investor facing tax rates of 0 on interest and dividends and c on
capital gains, the relative attractiveness of debt financing over equity
financing is measured at the margin by
(1 - 0) - [(1 - 'r)d(l 0) + (1 - d)(1 - c)} - b,
where r is the corporate tax rate, d is the dividend payout rate, and b is
the marginal bankruptcy cost. Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1990) specify
b as a function of the capital structure and obtain an expression for
selecting the capital structure that maximizes the net incentive for debt
financing.
In the frictionless model (b = 0) considered by Miller (1977), when no
dividends are paid (d0) and the effective tax rate on capital gains is zero
(c=0), the marginal investor is indifferent between bonds and equity if 0
= T.If 0> r, the investor wifi invest only in equity; if 0< T,the investor
wifi invest only in debt. While firms' capital structures are indeterminate
in Miller's model, the equilibrium capital structure for firms as a whole
depends on individual income-tax rates and the distribution of wealth
across tax brackets. While the Miller model is analytically transparent, its
predictions about investor clienteles and the lack of patterns in corporate
capital structures is counterfactual. Generally speaking, researchers
have attempted to extend the intuition by describing cross-sectional
variation in the net tax incentives based on non-debt tax shields or on
information incentive problems in financial contracting.
In the first research program, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) linked
non-debt tax shields with cross-sectional variation in debt policy. In their
approach, the firm's effective tax rate on interest deductions at the mar-
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investment tax credits.12 Despite the theoretical link between taxes and
debt policy, empirical work following Miller and DeAngelo and Masulis
failed to find statistical support for the theory.13 MacKie-Mason (1990)
improves on previous studies by focusing on how taxes affect capital-
structure decisions at the margin and by using data on incremental
financing decisions rather than firms' levels of debt. While this research
design leads to clear evidence that taxes affect financing decisions, it
does not provide a precise estimate of the long-term effects of fundamen-
tal tax reform on corporate financial structure. Exploiting the changes in
tax incentives created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Givoly, Hayn,
Ofer, and Sang (1992) find further support for the effects of taxes on
financing decisions.
Other sources of cross-sectional variation arise from information and
incentive problems in financial contracting. Debt can discipline the
moral hazard associated with equity financing (as in Jensen and Meck-
ling, 1976), although it can also lead to inefficient increases in managerial
risktaking (as in Myers, 1977). In such approaches, the desirability of
debt financing for non-tax reasons may vary across firms according to
differences in the extent of asymmetric information or in the tangibility
of assets being financed.
An additional source of cross-sectional variation comes from differ-
ences in firms' relative exposure to idiosyncratic and aggregate risk, as in
Gertler and Hubbard (1993). Even without taxes, the presence of both
types of risk leads to the use of both debt and equity in corporate capital
structures. Tax distortions confront firms with an ex ante trade-off be-
tween the costs of equity finance and the costs of increasing exposure to
the macroeconomic risk that accompanies debt financing. Consistent
with the model, Gertler and Hubbard show that, holding firm-level
determinants of dividends constant, dividend payments rise in aggre-
gate good times and fall in aggregate bad times.
An additional possible source of cross-sectional variation is cross-
country differences in capital structure for "similarly situated" firms.
Rajan and Zingales (1995) offer some suggestive evidence that cross-
country differences in the net incentive for debt financing are positively
associated with cross-country differences in leverage. One could extend
this line of inquiry by studying differences in leverage across countries
12Strictly speaking, this approach requires that the cross-sectional variation be exogenous.
This is a strong requirement; one firm may have more investment tax credits than a
"similar firm" because it has higher investment opportunities.
'3 Examples include Auerbach (1985); Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984); and Titman and
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for firms in the same industry or by exploiting the cross-sectional varia-
tion in the net incentive for leverage created by major tax reforms (as in
Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard, 1996, for investment).
Recent financial innovation also suggests cross-sectional variation in
firms' ability to increase leverage at the margin to finance investment.
Regulatory and other constraints may require some equity-like financ-
ing. One such innovation with growing popularity is a class of hybrid
securities typified by Monthly-Income Preferred Stock (MIPS).14
The key to achieving these tax benefits is the insertion of a noncor-
porate financial intermediary between the issuer of the security and the
buyer of the security. For MIPS, this intermediary is often a limited-
liability company (LLC) that is wholly owned by the issuer. The LLC is
taxed as a partnership under U.S. tax law because it has neither continu-
ity of life nor freely transferable ownership claims The LLC issues pub-
licly traded preferred stock and lends the proceeds to the parent as
subordinated debt. The parent's interest expense is tax-deductible, but it
is income for the LLC. Typically, the parent's interest payments are
timed to match the preferred stock dividends of the LLC. Thus MIPS
owners receive dividends equal to their share of the LLC's taxable in-
come and typically pay taxes on the cash received as ordinary income.15
For financial accounting purposes, the transaction is viewed as if the
parent had issued the preferred stock because it is the sole owner of the
common shares of the LLC.
Goldman Sachs developed MIPS in 1993. Subsequently, investment
banks have embellished upon the MIPS structure with various features
regarding the organizational form of the middleman, redemption op-
tions, and payment structures. Rather than forming an LLC, which has
the paperwork associated with partnership taxation, Merrill Lynch used
a trust as the financial intermediary in creating Trust-OriginatedPreferred
Securities (TOPRS).16 While, in 1993, these hybrid securities accounted
for just 4 percent of preferred-stock issues, they grew to 52 percent of
14For a comprehensive evaluation of MIPS, see Engel, Erickson, and Maydew (1997).
15The parent firm often has the right to defer interest payments. During such periods, the
LLC can suspend the payment of dividends but still accrues income interest, if the parent
defers interest payments, then the MIPS holder pays taxes before they receive cash divi-
dends. In contrast, with traditional preferred stock, if the issuer skips a dividend, the
investor does not have a tax liability.
16Other examples include Lehman Brothers' Quarterly-Income Capital Securities (QUICS)
and Goldman Sachs' Quarterly-Income Preferred Securities (QUIPS). QUICS are closer to
straight debt than the other securities and do not necessarily require a financial intermedi-
ary between the issuer and buyer; however, unlike standard debt, the issuer has the right
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preferred-stock issues in 1994 and over 70 percent of such issues in 1995
(see Cram and Jackson, 1996).
For the issuer, the advantage of MIPS over traditional preferred stock is
that dividends are paid with pre-tax income rather than after-tax income.
A corporation with a 35-percent tax rate raising $100 million through MIPS
with a yield of 10 percent saves $3.5 million annually in tax payments
relative to issuing traditional preferred stock with the same yield.17 In
practice, MIPS pay slightly higher yields (about 75 basis points) than
traditional preferred stock, so some of the firm's tax benefits are lost in the
form of higher pre-tax returns to investors (see Bary, 1995); whether this
difference in yields is associated with the introduction of a new financial
product or wifi be a characteristic of the long-run pricing of these securi-
ties is unclear. For individuals, the tax treatment of preferred-stock divi-
dends and MIPS dividends is the same (provided the parent does not
defer any interest payments). Because MIPS owners include allocated
income from the LLC in their tax bases (rather than dividends), corporate
investors do not get the dividends-received deduction for owning MIPS,
which may lead them to prefer traditional preferred stock.
The MIPS example highlights the somewhat arbitrary nature of decid-
ing whether a financing tool qualifies for the tax advantage of debt. It is
easy to imagine tax regulations reclassifying MIPS as preferred stock
rather than as debt by consolidating the parent firm and the financial
intermediary for tax purposes.18 However, these "simple" reforms beg
the question of determining when the financial intermediary is suffi-
ciently unrelated to the parent firm so that the loan receives the tax
treatment of debt.
Fundamental tax reform would eliminate the need for financial innova-
tions such as MIPS. By eliminating the distinction between debt and
equity, either CBIT or the flat tax would reduce the incentives to blur the
distinction between debt and equity. Under the current tax system, it is
' To make the $10 million annual dividend payments on traditional preferred stock, the
firm needs to earn $15.38 million in pre-tax income and pay $5.38 million in income taxes.
If the firm issues MIPS, then it deducts the $10 million payment from income; for the same
$15.38 million in earnings (before interest deductions), the firm would only pay tax of $1.88
million (35 percent of $5.38 million) for a tax saving of $3.5 million. This example holds the
firm's investment decision fixed; alternatively, if less-heavily taxed equity is available, the
firm may invest more, which would lower the marginal return to capital.
18Recent tax proposals from the Clinton administration (eventually excluded from the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997) have attacked MIPS and similar securities. These proposals
would base the distinction between debt and preferred stock on whether the instrument is
reported as debt on the balance sheet (for financial reporting) and the maturity of the
instrument ("MIPS" loans with maturities of greater than 15 years would be candidates for
reclassification). Norris (1997) discusses how firms are tailoring new securities to meet
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unclear why the level of taxation on investment should depend heavily
on the form of financing and the arbitrary tax rules determining the
taxation of different securities. As financial markets become even more
sophisticated, the line between debt and equity for tax purposes is likely
to be tested more often. Other recent examples of securities that chal-
lenge the tax classification are long-maturity (e.g., 50 or 100 years) zero-
coupon bonds and contingent debt (e.g., loans with interest payments
contingent on equity returns). By reducing the amounts of tax-motivated
financial innovation, these reforms may not greatly affect the level or
composition of corporate investment; however, there could be social
benefits from reducing the resources devoted to creating, marketing,
and managing these financial transactions.'9
Further empirical research is needed on the degree of substitutability
of debt and equity in capital structures and in household portfolios to
refine estimated welfare gains from eliminating financing distortions.
The economic models used in the Treasury Department's corporate-tax
integration study (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1992) suggest mod-
est efficiency gains from eliminating corporate financing distortions. Re-
turning to our theme, the gains from fundamental income tax reform
(CBIT) and the flat tax would be identical.
6. TIMING DISTORTIONS
The current tax system distorts the timing of many financial decisions as
taxpayers attempt to postpone (or, occasionally, accelerate) the recogni-
tion of income. In this form of tax planning, it is critical that the taxpayer
has some control over whether income is recognized (or realized) for tax
purposes. One example of how taxes may affect the timing of financial
decisions comes from the double taxation of corporate income. While the
corporate-level tax occurs when income is earned, the investor-level tax
is postponed until the corporation pays a dividend.20 The other main
19Measuring the social benefits from reducing these activities would be quixotic, but
anecdotal evidence suggests these activities are expensive. In June 1995, RJR Nabisco
offered to exchange $1.25 billion of outstanding 9.25-percent preferred stock for a 10-
percent issue of TOPRS. RJR paid fees totaling $20 million in part to convince investors to
swap into a new product; this marketing effort included mailings of Nabisco snack packs.
However, these payments were worthwhile for RJR; the net effect of the tax benefits and
the higher yield on the TOPRS was to save the firm $26 million in 1996 with similar benefits
expected in future years. See McConville (1996) for details.
20As we discuss below, if future dividend taxes are capitalized into current stock prices, then
current shareholders who sell their shares may bear part of the burden of the future dividend
taxes. The key point, however, is that the sellers have some discretion over whether they sell
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class of timing distortions comes from the reliance in the current income
tax on the realization principle for measuring some income, most notably
capital gains income. For investors in financial assets, these incentives
lead to a "lock-in" effect for assets with capital gains and to tax-motivated
trading strategies. At the business level, similar tax planning issues arise
in the area of mergers and acquisitions.21 In this section, we examine the
effects of taxes on corporate payout policy, one of the major timing issues
in corporate finance. We then discuss how financial innovation has com-
plicated defining income with the realization principle.
6.1 Corporate Payout Policy
One significant source of tax asymmetry in corporate financial policy
arises from the differential treatment at the individual level of equity
income in the form of dividends and capital gains. Distributing earn-
ings through dividends is taxed more highly than distributing earnings
through capital gains generated by reinvested earnings or share repur-
chases.
Financial economists have offered two explanations for why corporate
dividends are paid despite the tax bias against dividend distributions
(see, e.g., the review of Poterba and Summers, 1985; and U.S. Treasury
Department, 1992) The firstknown as the "traditional view"argues
that dividends offer non-tax benefits to shareholders that offset their
apparent tax disadvantage. For example, analogous to the earlier discus-
sion of non-tax benefits of debt financing, high dividend payouts may
decrease managerial discretion over internal funds. Alternatively, divi-
dends may provide signals to investors about a firm's prospects or rela-
tive financial strength, although the need to maintain dividend payments
as a signal wifi constrain the use of retained earnings as a corporation's
source of financing for new investments. Under the traditional view,
firms set dividend payments so that, for the last dollar of dividends paid,
the incremental non-tax benefit of dividends equals their incremental tax
cost. Thus the amount of dividends paid out is expected to decrease as
the tax burden on dividends relative to capital gains increases.The
Treasury Department's integration report largely adopted this approach.
21 We discuss the effects of tax reform on the taxation of mergers and acquisitions in more
detail in Gentry and Hubbard (199Th). Auerbach and Reishus (1988) discuss the effects of
taxes on merger and acquisition activity.
It is fair to say that the question of why distributions take the form of dividends
instead of, say, share repurchasesis an open question for research.
The traditional view is not represented by a single analytical model. Inmost implementa-
tions, the traditional view is taken to be consistent with models in which firms derive an
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The second explanation, or "tax capitalization view," assumes that
dividends offer no non-tax benefits to shareholders relative to retained
earnings (see Auerbach, 1979; Bradford, 1981; and King,1977).24 An
additional assumption in this view is that corporations have no alterna-
tive to dividends (like share repurchases) for distributing funds toshare-
holders. As a result, investor-level taxes on dividends reduce thevalue
of the firm (as they are capitalized in share values), but wouldgenerally
affect neither corporate dividend nor investment decisions. Underthe
assumptions of the tax capitalization view, corporate tax integration or
switching to the flat tax would not encourage corporations to increase
dividend payouts for existing equity, but would confer a windfall on
holders of existing equity.
Two types of empirical tests figure prominently in examinationsof the
traditional view. One approach (identified with Poterba and Summers,
1985) tests the relative predictive power of a model in whichmarginal
equity financing comes through new shares issues (in which q =1, the
traditional view) and a model in which retained earnings are the marginal
source of equity financing (in which q <1, the tax-capitalization view).
Poterba and Summers find that the q model based on the traditionalview
has greater explanatory power (though there are real concernsabout
measurement error in proxies for q; see Hassett and Hubbard, 1997).A
second line of inquiry compares the costs of paying dividendswith the
effect of distributions on share values. Bernheim and Wantz (1995) argue,
for example, that if dividends are used to signal future prospects,their
information content (effect on value) should relate to their tax cost.
Bernheim and Wantz estimate that the information content perdollar of
dividend distributions declined with the investor tax rate ondividends in
U.S. tax reforms in 1981 and 1986, consistent with thetraditional view.
Such evidence is not necessarily inconsistent with the taxcapitalization
view if the reductions in marginal tax rates on dividends wereanticipated
by investors.
The tax capitalization view confronts the problem thatdividends ap-
pear to be smoothed relative tofluctuations in fixed-investment spend-
els are those in which firms pay dividends to: signal private informationabout profitability
(see, e.g., Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; and Bernheimand Wantz, 1995);
reduce the scope for managerial discretion (see, e.g., Easterbrook, 1984, andJensen, 1986);
or accommodate investors' "behavioral" preferencesfor dividends (see, e.g., Shefrin and
Statman, 1984).
24 Studies of integration by the American Law Institute have sometimes adopted this view.
American Law Institute (1989) assumed the tax capit1i7ation view ofthe dividend deci-
sion, while American Law Institute (1992) generally argues the traditionalview as a general
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ing. However, simple predictions about the comovement of dividends
and investment are confounded when firms have financial slack or use
both debt and equity financing (see, e.g., Gertler and Hubbard, 1993;
Gross, 1995; and Auerbach and Hassett, 1997).
Harris and Kemsley (1997) and Harris, Hubbard, and Kemsley (1997)
study the direct prediction of the tax-capitalization view that the divi-
dend tax is capitalized in share values. Specifically, these papers observe
that retained earnings are subject to dividend taxes upon distribution,
but paid-in equity can be returned to shareholders as a tax-free return of
capital. This observation leads to the cross-sectional prediction that divi-
dend taxes result in a lower value for retained earnings than for total
common equity, which includes paid-in capital. Using firm-level data for
the United States, they find, consistent with dividend tax capitalization,
that accumulated retained earnings are valued less per unit than paid-in
capital. In addition, examining firm-level data for a set of countries with
different degrees of corporate tax integration, cross-country variation in
dividend tax rates is associated with predictable variation in the implied
dividend tax discount. This set of evidence provides some support for at
least partial capitalization of the dividend tax.
6.2 Financial Innovation and Realization-Based Tax Rules
In this subsection, we present a stylized example of how derivative
securities can be used in tax planning and discuss how the prototypical
reforms would affect these forms of tax avoidance. Our example has
three critical features. First, assets differ in how they are taxed. Second,
tax rate differences across investors create tax-motivated clienteles for
the assets. Third, derivative securities can be written on the assets with-
out triggering a change in how the underlying assets are taxed.
A simple illustration of how taxation differs across assets is the differ-
ence between assets taxed on an accrual basis and those taxed on a realiza-
tion basis. For a constant tax rate, accrual-based taxation leads to a higher
tax burden than realization-based taxation because the realization princi-
ple allows for deferral of taxes. For concreteness, we label the asset taxed
on accrual as debt and the asset taxed upon realization as (non-dividend-
paying) equity. With these labels, the assets have obvious economic dif-
ferences in terms of risk, priority in bankruptcy, and decision-making
responsibilities. In some cases, these non-tax differences can be quite
small (recall the discussion of MIPS in the previous section); however, for
the tax code to treat the assets differently, the assets need at least some
cosmetic non-tax difference. Our example focuses on the differences in
risk and assumes the other non-tax motivations for holding different
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Tax rate differences across investors could come from a variety of
sources. The simplest example of tax rate differences across investors is
perhaps that between taxable investors and tax-exempt investors, such
as pension funds. Other differences include those caused by progressive
rates and by differences across business in loss carryforward positions.
The combination of the differences in tax treatment of assets and tax
rates for investors creates tax-motivated clienteles for the assets. For
simplicity, we consider a transaction between a taxable investor and a
non-taxable investor. Similar calculations hold for any tax rate differen-
tial. The taxable investor prefers the lightly-taxed asset, and the non-
taxable investor if the natural clientele for the heavily-taxed asset.
The downside to these tax-motivated investment strategies is that the
high-tax-rate investor might not like the non-tax characteristics of the
lightly-taxed asset (e.g., it is too risky) and vice versa. Derivative securi-
ties offer investors a mechanism for trading the risk characteristics of the
assets without giving up the tax characteristics. As an example of a
derivative security, we use a swap contract.25 Suppose the debt offers a
riskless return and the equity offers a risky return. For tax reasons, tax-
exempt investors tilt their portfolios toward debt and the taxable inves-
tors increase their relative holdings of equity. To undo this tax distortion
in the riskiness of their portfolios, the investors enter into a swap con-
tract. The tax-exempt investor promises to pay the taxable investor the
return on a fixed amount of debt in exchange for the return on an
investment on the same-size stake in the equity security at some speci-
fied future date (e.g., five years from the beginning of the contract). The
size of the investment (i.e., the fixed amount of debt specified in the
contract) is referred to as the notional principal for the contract. Through
the swap contract, the high-tax-rate investor's exposure to the risk of the
equity return falls and the tax-exempt investor's exposure to this risk
increases. However, this contract is taxed on a cash-flow basis rather
than an accrual basis.
At the end of the contract, if the equity has outperformed the debt,
then the taxable investor pays the tax-exempt investor the value of the
equity return in excess of the return on debt.26 This payment would
The swap contract is convenient for expository purposes. However, the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997 changed the rules so that investors with unrealized gains on swap contracts
must recognize them before the termination of the contract. One can design similar strate-
gies by combining put and call options. In describing the strategies with options, it is
necessary to keep track of the exercise prices of the different options and the tax treatment
of the premiums in addition to the cash flows at settlement.
Contracts settle on a net basis rather than each party making a gross payment to the
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decrease the taxable investor's taxable income and increase the tax base
of the counterparty (not relevant in the case of the tax-exempt inves-
tor).27 The taxable investor has hedged the risk of owning the equity,
replacing the risky return with the safe return on debt. However, the
taxation of this safe return is deferred until the settlement of the swap
contract. Effectively, the taxable investor has recharacterized the finan-
cial return on debt from being taxed on accrual to being taxed on a
realization basis.
These tax avoidance strategies are even more powerful when the
owner of the equity has an unrealized capital gain. The swap contract
allows the investor to hedge the risk of future price changes but continue
to defer the tax on the gain. Without these derivative securities, the
unrealized capital gain creates the well-known "lock-in" effect of discour-
aging portfolio reallocation. The derivative securities allow investors to
sidestep the lock-in effect: The derivative security can hedge all (or, at
the investor's discretion, some) of the risk of keeping the asset with gain,
but its use does not trigger a tax on the unrealized gain. Of course, for
many investors, the transaction costs of this type of tax planning are
prohibitively high; however, as liquidity in these financial markets im-
proves, the costs of these strategies may fall considerably.
Tax reform greatly reduces the scope for tax planning through deriva-
tive securities. Both CBIT and the flat tax eliminate the critical elements
of these strategiesthe disparity in tax rates across assets and across
investors. For both the issuer and the investor, debt and equity have
symmetric treatment. For financial investments, both reforms have zero
marginal tax rates for all investors. Thus investors can reallocate their
portfolios without triggering realization-based taxes. By eliminating the
rationales behind these investment strategies, fundamental tax reform
would curtail the revenue losses associated with tax arbitrage. Another
benefit from this tax simplification would be reducing the uncertainty
firms face regarding tax regulations.
7. FINANCING DECISIONS AND TAX INCIDENCE
In this section, we describe two general frameworks for analyzing the
incidence of the corporate income tax. In these analyses, corporate fi-
nancing decisions play a pivotal role in predicting the incidence of fimda-
mental tax reform. Thus the evidence on tax distortions of organization
In this example, we focus on how derivatives change the risk exposures of portfolios and
the timing of tax liabilities. There are also issues as to whether the income is classified as
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TABLE 1
Effect of the Flat Tax on Business Organization and Financing Decisions
Effect traceable to
Move to CBIT-f
Factor Effect on CBIT flat tax
Factors influencing organizational form
Elimination of classicalCorporate versus 'I
corporation income taxnoncorporate form
Factors influencing capital structure
Elimination of tax Corporate capital structure J
distinction between
debt and equity
Elimination between Corporate payout policy I
retentions and
distributions
and financing decisions surveyed in the previous sections helps under-
stand the debate over how tax reform wifi affect rates of return. As
summarized in Table 1, the major effects of these reforms on corporate
financing decisions are similar. We proceed to analyze the effects of tax
reform on the risk-free interest rate and stock prices. The risk-free inter-
est rate is important for comparing consumption-tax and income-tax
reforms, since, as we discussed in section 3 it is the portion of the return
to capital for which the tax treatment differs under the two reforms.
7.1 Frameworks for Analyzing Tax Reform
Much of the policy discussion in the United States over reform of capital
income taxation has focused on the excess burden and incidence of the
classical corporation tax. In the classic partial-factor tax approach of
Harberger (1962, 1966), the corporate tax affects the required return on
marginal equity-financed investments in the corporate sector, thereby
distorting organizational form and investment decisions. In the central
case emphasized by Harberger, the burden of the tax is borneby owners
of capital generally.
An opposing view traces to Stiglitz's (1973) exposition of the corpora-
tion tax. i, in contrast to Harberger's all-equity-financed world, marginal
investment projects are financed by debt, the corporate tax does not dis-
tort investment decisions; the burden of the tax is borne by inframarginal214Gentry & Hubbard
equity and any economic rents associated with new investment. This
story is consistent with the ideas of dividend tax capitalization and fric-
tionless decisions about capital structure, as we describe below.
Returning to our consideration of fundamental tax reform, integration
has different efficiency and distributional consequences in the two ap-
proaches. In the Harberger approach, integration eliminates a costly
distortion of organizational form and reduces the tax burden on invest-
ment and the tax burden on owners of capital generally. In the Stiglitz
approach, efficiency consequences of integration are minimal, and the
elimination of the incremental corporate tax creates a windfall gain for
current equity holders. The Harberger and Stiglitz approaches are more
similar in their depiction of the consequences of moving from an inte-
grated tax system of the CBIT form to a consumption tax of the flat-tax
form. In either approach, the shift in tax base eliminates the tax on the
riskiess return to capital, increasing investment demand.
7.2 Tax Reform, Interest Rates, and Stock Prices
How integration affects interest rates on business debt has been the
subject of considerable debate (see, e.g., Feldstein, 1995, and Hall,
1996b). The conventional closed-economy explanation of the effect of
interest rates of switching from the current tax system to an integrated
tax system of the CBIT form is that the pre-tax interest rate should fall
(see Hall and Rabushka, 1983, 1995, and Hall, 1996a). The intuition for
this argument is as follows. Two features of the CBIT reform would
directly affect corporate interest rates. First, taxes on interest income are
eliminated. Second, interest deductibility is eliminated. In the market for
business credit, the supply and demand schedules for credit (as a func-
tion of the interest rate) both shift down. In the simplest story, all inter-
est income is taxed, and all interest expenses are deducted. In a closed
economy, if there is no heterogeneity in tax rates, the introduction of
CBIT maintains the existing after-tax interest rate; that is, the pre-tax
interest rate falls by the amount of the tax.'29
Hall's argument for flat or declining interest rates in response to CBIT-
type integration is in this spirit. Taking the Stiglitz (1973) model
incorporating dividend tax capitalizationas a benchmark, integration
should have no effect on the marginal return on equity-financed invest-
ment. To maintain (closed-economy) capital-market equilibrium, the
In a small, open economy, integration increases desired international lending.
29In reality, of course, there is heterogeneity in the effective tax rates facing suppliers and
demanders of credit. For example, tax-exempt investors and light-taxed foreign investors
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net-of-tax return on debt also wifi not change. Hence, as in Hall's analy-
sis, the pre-tax interest rate falls by the amount of the tax.
Feldstein's argument for a rising interest rate in response to integra-
lion is closer to the Harberger benchmark. In this setting, integration
increases the marginal return on equity-financed corporate investment
(capitalization effects are minimal). Maintaining capital-market equilib-
rium requires the after-tax interest rate to rise.
One can add to these analyses of how integration affects interest rates
the consequences of expensing of capital expenditures (as in the move-
ment from CBIT to the flat tax). The effect of the shift from CBIT to the
flat tax on interest rates depends on the interest sensitivity of the supply
of funds to the domestic business sector. If the domestic business sector
is a "small open economy," the introduction of the flat tax leaves interest
rates at their CBIT levels, consistent with Hall's analysis. If the supply of
funds is not perfectly elastic, the higher demand for funds puts upward
pressure on interest rates, consistent with Feldstein's analysis of a shift
to consumption taxation. Table 2 summarizes the effects of tax reform on
interest rates.
Fullerton and Gordon (1983) use a computable general equilibrium
model with endogenous financial behavior (calibrated to 1973 data) to
simulate the effects of integrating corporate and personal income taxes.
In their case, in which any revenue lost from this reform is replaced by a
lump-sum tax on individuals, the risk-free interest rate changes by only
a few basis points relative to the equilibrium without the reform, in both
the short run and the long run. While the data underlying these results
are dated, the findings fall squarely in the middle of the current debate
integration of the corporate and personal taxes neither substantially
raises nor lowers interest rates.
Both Hall and Feldstein assume that a fixed fraction of marginal invest-
ments (zero in Hall's case and positive in Feldstein's case) is financed
with equity. To the extent that information and incentive problems in
capital markets suggest a role for debt and equity in the capital structure,
removing the double taxation of corporate equity returns would then
lead to a substitution of equity for debt and gains in efficiency (see the
results of simulation models used in U.S. Department of the Treasury,
1992). The Harberger and Stiglitz benchmarks also imply different reac-
tions of stock prices to tax reform. In the Harberger setting, capitaliza-
lion is absent, so stock prices do not change in response to CBIT-type
integration. By contrast, incorporating dividend tax capitalization into
the Stiglitz framework, integration should increase stock prices. Moving
from CBIT-type integration to the flat-tax price should rescue stock
prices, all else being equal, owing to the expensing of "new capital" (see,216Gentry &Hubbard
TABLE 2
Effects of the Flat Tax on Corporate Interest Rates
Factors influencing demand for credit
Elimination of interest Vt
deductibility (Issue: heterogeneity
of rates)
Shift to expensing + /0 Vt
(Issue: elasticity of
supply of funds to
business sector)
Factors influencing supply of credit
Elimination of interest Vt
taxation (Issue: heterogeneity
of rates)
Increase in equity + /0 Vt
returns (Issue: Dividend tax
capitalization)
Increased saving - /0 Vt
Issue: Capital-market
integration)
for example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987, and Hall, 1996a).3° At the
current corporate tax rate of 35 percent, the move from current law to
expensing for equipment investment would lead to a decline in equity
values through this channel of about 8 percent (using the calculations in
Hassett and Hubbard, 1997).31 Table 3 reviews the issues of how tax
reform would affect stock prices.
30Under the income tax, the effective cost per dollar of capital goods purchased equals
- iz), where r is the corporate tax rate and z is the present value of depreciation
deductions for the invested dollar. Under the consumption tax, capital investment is
expensed, so that z rises to unity and the effective cost per dollar of capital goods pur-
chased falls to $(1 r). That is, one can think of the investment incentives accompanying
expensing as reducing the price of capital. If "new capital" purchased under the expensing
(consumption tax) regime is otherwise the same as "old capital" in place under the depre-
ciation (income tax) regime, the price of old capital wifi fall.
This simple calculation assumes that firms can costlessly adjust their fixed capital stocks
to take advantage of changes in expected profitability or in the tax treatment of investment.
Effect on corporate Effect traceable to
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TABLE 3
Effects of the Flat-Tax Reform on Equity Prices
Shift to expensing - I
Elimination of investor- +/0 'I
level dividend tax
Elimination of capital-gains +
tax
Reduction of tax rate on +
business income
As we described above, available evidence suggests that both debt and
equity are likely to be used in new investment and that at least part of
the dividend tax is capitalized in share values. The former observation
confirms the economic intuition in the Treasury Department's evalua-
tion of the salutary effects of integration. The latter observation suggests
that some windfall gains will accompany integration. That is, integration
would likely raise stock prices. In addition, to the extent that base
broadening in tax reform reduces marginal tax rates, tax reform can
reduce the tax rate on business income (or business cash flow), raising
the present values of after-tax returns on business investments and eq-
uity values in the short run.
8. TAX PLANNING AFTER TAX REFORM
One of the most radical features of fundamental tax reform is its shift in
the types of transactions subject to the tax system. The current income-
tax base includes both "real" and "financial" transactions. For example,
measuring corporate income as a proxy for the return on the productive
assets of the firm is an exercise in taxing real transactions, whereas
measuring the returns on the debt and equity contracts financing this
Economic studies of investment have shown, however, that firms face costs of installing
new capital goods, leading firms to smooth changes in their capital stocks over time. If
these "adjustment costs" are high, old capital remains valuable relative to new capital, and
stock prices need not fall. If adjustment costs are low, the shift to expensing per se reduces
stock prices. In their review of existing studies, Hassett and Hubbard (1997) conclude that
adjustment costs are relatively low, so that focusing on the changes inTand z is sensible
for estimating consequences of expensing for stock prices.
Effect on Effect traceable to
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investment focuses on a set of financial transactions. Neither CBIT nor
the flat tax would attempt to tax financial transactions; instead, these tax
systems focus on taxing real transactions by businesses and households.
CBIT would measure the capital income of businesses and the labor
income of households; the flat tax would levy a cash-flow tax on busi-
nesses and a labor income tax on households. Financial transactions
between businesses, between households, or between a business and a
household would not be targets of the tax system.
Excluding financial transactions from the tax base is not necessarily a
feature of fundamental tax reform. Alternative integration proposals,
such as dividend deduction or imputation systems, would continue to
base the tax system on a combination of real and financial transactions.
Consumption-tax proposals based on the personal-expenditure model,
such as the recent USA Tax proposal, would also tax a combination of
real and financial transactions. Thus the advantages and disadvantages
of focusing the tax system on real transactions are specific to the propos-
als we outlined as prototypes for reform rather than being generic fea-
hires of moving to a pure income or consumption tax.
Fundamental tax reform dramatically reduces the incentives for tax
planning. This reduction comes primarily from reducing the disparity in
tax rates for various types of transactions. For example, under either the
flat tax or CBIT, investors in financial assets face a marginal tax rate of
zero. In addition, issuers of financial assets do not get deductions from
their tax bases for returns paid on different financial assets (e.g., interest
is not deductible). For real assets used for business purposes, all firms
have a common marginal tax rate that applies to cash flow under the flat
tax or business income under CBIT. Furthermore, allowing losses to be
carried forward with interest reduces the tax rate differential between
firms with positive and firms with negative tax bases. In addition, to the
extent that it lowers top marginal tax rates, tax reform reduces the incen-
tives for clientele-based tax planning even in cases when a transaction is
taxed differently across investors. By not taxing financial transactions,
tax reform eliminates the tax rate differentials on ordinary and capital
income and on debt and equity returns. Thus tax reform eliminates the
tax preference for different forms of financing and the incentives for
forming tax clienteles in portfolio choice.
While these prototypical tax reforms eliminate the distinctions be-
tween debt and equity and the tax status of many business organiza-
tional forms, they rely on separating business transactions into "real"
and "financial" categories. It is natural to ask whether reliance on this
classification wifi create a new genre of tax planning techniques. For
many transactions, such as the purchase of a printing press or a bankTax Reform and Corporate Financial Policy219
loan, the classification seems incorruptible. Tax planning, however, can
involve devising complex legal transactions to accomplish simple goals.
To fix ideas, we examine a stylized case of the tax treatment of the sale of
an intangible asset under the flat tax and CBIT. We also briefly review
the challenges created by financial intermediaries for tax reform that
have been discussed in more detail elsewhere (see, e.g., Bradford, 1996).
One area in which the distinction between real and financial transac-
tions can become blurred is the creation of intangible capital, such as the
transfer of a new technology. For simplicity, consider a small research
firm owned by an inventor. The firm has expertise in research but not in
manufacturing, so it plans to sell its research output to other firms. The
firm produces a new invention with a market value far in excess of the
research cost. To ensure that the inventor receives the rewards to the
invention, we assume that the new technology cannot be replicated by
other firms. If this new technology is embodied in a piece of tangible
equipment, then selling the invention would obviously fit the definition
of a "real" transaction. Under a consumption-tax version of tax reform,
this transaction increases the tax base of the inventor and decreases the
tax base of the buyer by equal amounts. Under an income-tax reform,
this transaction increases the tax base of the inventor by the sales price,
but because the buyer depreciates the machinery, the present value of
the buyer's tax base falls by less than the purchase price of the machine.
The distinction between real and financial transactions is less clear if
the invention is protected by a patent rather than being embodied in
physical capital. The question becomes whether selling the patent is a
real or a financial transaction. If it is a real transaction, then the tax
treatment is identical to the sale of a machine; if it is a financial transac-
tion, then the sales price wifi not be included in the seller's tax base or
give rise to deductions for the buyer. The seller would prefer to label the
transaction as "financial" to avoid including it as taxable income, but the
buyer would prefer to label it as a "real" transaction to generate deduc-
tions (either immediately under a consumption tax or over time under
an income tax). Therefore, the first rule for eliminating this tax avoid-
ance scheme is to force the buyer and seller to treat the transaction
symmetrically.
The choice of whether the transaction is real or financial will greatly
affect the price of the patentthe pre-tax price of a real transaction will
be higher than the price in a financial transaction (in which the pre-tax
price equals the after-tax price), because a real transaction reduces the
tax liability of the buyer but increases the tax liability of the seller. Under
a consumption tax, assuming the buyer and seller face the same mar-
ginal tax rate, the decreased tax liability of the buyer exactly offsets the220 Gentry & Hubbard
increased tax liabffity of the seller. Thus the parties should be indifferent
to whether the transaction is classified as real or financial. For an income
tax, treating the transaction as financial may lower the total tax liabilities
of the buyer and seller because the buyer will get deductions only over
the life of the patent rather than at the time of purchase. That is, the
income tax will levy a tax on the time value of waiting for these deprecia-
tion allowances by collecting tax from the seller but reducing the buyer's
tax base only over time.
Because under an income tax the tax revenue generated by this transac-
tion depends on whether it is treated as a real or as a financial transac-
tion, the tax code would need rules, such as amortization schedules
based on the projected life of a patent, for determining the tax treatment
of a transaction. However, tax planning sometimes pushes the limits of
regulations. For example, rather than purchase the patent and take tax
deductions according to the amortization schedule, the acquiring firm
could buy all of the equity of the firm that owns the patent.32 By selling
equity rather than the patent, the purchase price is not included in the
seller's tax base. After the merger, the buyer could use the patent and
would be allowed tax deductions associated with the new business;
however, the buyer would not get depreciation allowances for tax pur-
poses for the entire purchase price of the business. Given the time value
of money, the present value of the reduction in the seller's tax liability
should exceed the present value of any additional taxes paid by the
buyer created by opting for a financial transaction rather than a real
transaction. This example highlights the ability of businesses to struc-
ture transactions as the transfer of either real or financial assets, depend-
ing on which provides the better tax result. Provided that the transaction
is between two businesses with the same tax rate, this form of tax plan-
ning is effective under CBIT, but not under the flat tax, because the firms
should be indifferent to the distinction between real and financial trans-
actions under the flat tax.
If the businesses do not have the same tax rate or one party to the
transaction is a household, then the distinction between real and finan-
cial transactions can create tax planning opportunities even under the
flat tax. For a transaction between a business and a household, the tax
base of the business includes cash received for real transactions (the sale
of goods or services) but not the proceeds from financial transactions
(roceeds from borrowing or interest received); neither type of transac-
3Alternatively, the firm with the patent could create a subsidiary that owns the patent
and sell the shares of the subsidiary to the acquirer. While the government could reclassify
sham transactions, our objective here is to give an idea of how tax advisors will take
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lion creates a deduction from the household's tax base. Thus, in the
extreme, the tax incentives are for a household to buy grocery stores and
consume the inventory instead of buying groceries. A morerealistic
example, discussed by McLure and Zodrow (1996), involves dividing a
household's payment for durable consumption goods into the purchase
price of the good (included in the seller's tax base) and the interest on a
loan (not included in the seller's tax base).33 The general tax-avoidance
issue, applicable in some degree to the current system, is whether a
business can transfer consumption to its owners (or employees) without
that consumption's being measured appropriately by the tax system.
Tax planning that uses (or abuses) the distinction between real and
financial transactions may be especially acute for financial services be-
cause the firm's "real" product (financial services) isinexorably linked to
financial transactions. Bradford (1996) discusses the difficulties of taxing
financial services. He concludes that the problems of taxing the financial-
service industry are not particular to either type of tax system. However,
some types of tax reforms (especially thosesimilar to a value-added tax,
as are the flat tax and CBIT) raise the politicalprofile of these problems.
In addition, for transactions between firms, provided the two businesses
face the same marginal tax rate, the tax treatment of financial in-
termediation is of relatively minor importance. This conclusion follows
from the same type of arguments we described above for why the choice
of treating the sale of a patent under the flat tax as a real or a financial
transaction does not affect the total tax liability placed on the transac-
tion.:35 Thus the issue for financial services becomes mainly an issue of
measuring household consumption.
Fundamental tax reform, as represented by either CBIT or the flat tax,
could potentially uproot many of the standard corporate tax planning
techniques. These reforms lead to a more consistent and symmetric treat-
ment of various financial transactions. Quantifying thesocial benefits
from these changes, in terms of equity and efficiency gains, is a daunting
McLure and Zodrow argue that these types of tax avoidance schemesmight be so
difficult to monitor that consumption-tax reform could be better implemented under what
they call a "hybrid" consumption tax. Under this hybrid, households would face a tax base
similar to the flat tax (i.e., financial transactions are excluded from the tax base), but the
business-level tax base would include both real and financial transactions. This proposal
would maintain the neutrality between debt and equity financing by including all proceeds
from raising capital in the tax base of the firm and allowing the firm deductions for all
disbursements on financial contracts (returns of capital, principal, interest, and dividends).
34For a discussion of this type of tax avoidance under the current hybrid income tax, see
Clotfelter (1983) and Bradford (1986).
Because financial services are not durable (i.e., they would not need to be depreciated as
an input to production), this conclusion holds for CBIT as well asthe flat tax.222Gentry & Hubbard
task because the associated distortions arise in areas that are difficult to
measure, such as risk characteristics of portfolios and transaction costs
in financial markets.
We conclude this section with two cautionary notes. First, while tax
reforms promise to reduce known tax-planning techniques, some lati-
tude would still exist for tax avoidance (especially in distinguishing real
and financial transactions), and tax lawyers can be ingenious in creating
new methods (see, e.g., Feld, 1995, and Ginsburg, 1995). Second, we
have focused on the benefits of tax reform when tax rates are constant
over time; the transition to this regime (or future changes in tax rates)
might create opportunities for tax avoidance that could result in costly
losses of tax revenues.
9. CONCLUSION
Discussion of "fundamental tax reform" by policymakersand some-
times by economistsoften treats income-tax reform and consumption-
tax reform as polar opposites. In this paper, we evaluate consequences
of tax reform for corporate financial policybusiness organizational,
financing, and tax planning activitiesto distinguish between effects of
income tax reform and those of consumption tax reform. We focus on
one fundamental income tax reform proposal (the Treasury Depart-
ment's comprehensive business income tax and one consumption tax
reform proposal (the flat tax).
Our principal conclusions are four. First, relative to CBIT, the flat tax
exempts only the risk-free return to capital; the two taxes treat similarly
returns arising from risk bearing, luck, or inframarginal elements. Sec-
ond, the effect of fundamental tax reform on the risk-free interest rates
depends on whether dividend taxes are capitalized in share values and
on the elasticity of the supply of funds to the domestic business sector
with respect to the net return. As long as the supply of funds to the
business sector is highly elastic, most of the effect on interest rates is a
consequence of income tax reform (moving to CBIT). Third, effects of tax
reform on organization and financing decisions stem from income tax
reform, though the flat tax permits simpler rules for mergers and acquisi-
tions than CBIT. Finally, with regard to financial innovation for tax
planning, to the extent that such innovations arise to muddle the distinc-
tion between debt and equity for tax purposes, they are no longer neces-
sary under either CBIT or the flat tax. One difference between the two
types of reform is that the flat tax is neutral between real and financial
transactions, while CBIT may create some tax motivations for structur-
ing merger and acquisition transactions as financial rather than real.Tax Reform and Corporate Financial Policy223
Our analysis has implications for the policy debate over tax reform
and for economic research. Because fundamental income tax reform and
consumption tax reform have broadly similar effects on many business
decisions, policymakers should not consider the reforms in opposition to
one another. For economists, obtaining quantitative estimatesof the
effects of either reform on business investment, organizational, and fi-
nancing decisions and of efficiency gains requires more robust conclu-
sions about the effect of dividend taxes on share prices, the elasticity of
the supply of funds to the domestic business sector, and the substitut-
ability of debt and equity in capital structures. These questions are, of
course, not new, but they remain important topics forresearch in mea-
suring gains from fundamental tax reform. In addition, further research
on transition questions is needed to shed light on the consequencesof
tax reform, such as the speed with which debt and equity contracts can
be renegotiated and the extent to which anticipated future changes in tax
rates cause significant tax-planning distortions.
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INTRODUCTION
In the 104th Congress, several legislative proposalswere introduced to
replace the federal income tax system with a consumption-based tax
system. These proposals included the unlimited savings allowance
(USA) tax (S. 722) introduced by former Senator Sam Nunn and Senator
Pete Domenici, the fiat tax (H.R. 2060) introduced by House Majority
Leader Dick Armey, and the national retail sales tax (H.R. 3039) intro-
duced by Reps. Dan Schaefer and Billy Tauzin.
With the exception of the USA tax, these proposals containno transition
rules for businesses to address wealth effects that would arise from im-
position of a new tax system. Nonetheless, experience with previousma-
jor tax reforms, such as the Tax Reform Act of 1986, suggests that Congress
would ultimately provide extensive transition rules, both to minimize
disruptions to the economy, and to garner political support for reform.
Recent analyses of tax restructuring proposals have suggested that the
transition "problem" would be large. For example, Jane Gravelle (1995)
estimated that replacing the corporate income tax with a 20-percent fiat
tax would cause the stock market to fall 20 to 30 percent. Analyses by
David Bradford (1996) and Robert Hall (1996) find similar reductions in
the value of existing wealth.
The effects of tax reform on the book value of the firm are discussed in
section 2 of this paper, and are distinguished from the effects of tax
reform on the market value of the firm.1 Section 3 presents estimates of
transitional wealth effects from replacing the income tax with the fiat tax
or the retail sales tax (RST). The estimates utilize financial statement data
for 96 U.S. corporations in 12 industries. The extent to which wealth
effects may be mitigated by allowing the deduction of unrecovered basis
is also estimated. Section 4 presents our conclusions and discusses practi-
cal difficulties with providing transition relief.2
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FOR INCOME AND
CONSUMPTION TAXES
2.1 Financial Accounting for Income Taxes
Financial accounting for income taxes is governed by the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (FASB) in its Statement of Financial Account-
ing Standards No. 109 (FAS 109). The summary to FAS 109 provides that
1See Lyon, Merrill, Schwarz, and Edwards (1997).
2The paper does not quantify the revenue or welfare costs of providing transition relief.
These costs would need to be weighed in determining whether to provide transition rules.Transitional Issues in Fundamental Tax Reform231
"[t}he objectives of accounting for income taxes are to recognize (a) the
amount of taxes payable or refundable for the current year and (b) de-
ferred tax liabilities and assets for the future tax consequences of events
that have been recognized in an enterprise's financial statements or tax
returns."
If deferred tax liabilities and assets were not taken into account, then
the financial-accounting tax expense for any period would generally be
equal to the income taxes required to be paid for that period. However,
the need to recognize the effect of future tax consequences through the
deferred-tax accounts means that the financial-accounting tax expense
wifi be either more (in the case of a deferred tax liabifity) or less (in the
case of a deferred-tax asset) than is actually required tobe paid.
FAS 109 required that deferred-tax assets and liabilities arising from
temporary differences between book and tax accounting be recorded in
the balance sheet. An increase in the net deferred tax liability account
increases tax expense, and an increase in the net deferred tax asset
account reduces tax expense in the current period, compared to the
amount required to be paid.
211 Deferred-Tax Accounts A deferred tax liabffity is required where
there are temporary differences that will result in taxable amounts in
future years. For example, if the gain on a sale is reported for tax pur-
poses using the installment method, current income-tax paymentswifi
be reduced, but additional taxes will have to be paid in the future. These
additional taxes, measured using current income-tax rules and rates, are
recognized as a deferred tax liability.3 The financial-accounting expense
attributable to these additional taxes is recognized at the same time,
making the financial-accounting tax expense for the period greater than
the amount actually paid.
A deferred-tax asset is recorded for temporary differences that wifi
result in deductible amounts in the future, as well as the anticipated
reduction in future tax liability attributable to the carry forward of such
items as net operating losses and tax credits. For example, a taxpayer
subject to the corporate alternative minimum tax (AMT) generates a
FAS 109 used the enacted rate expected to apply to taxable income in the periods in
which the deferred tax liability or asset is expected to be settled or realized (FAS 109,
paragraph 18). This may require the consideration of federal, state, and foreign tax rates.
Because deferred taxes are not generally provided on the foreign source income of non-
U.S. subsidiaries that wifi be indefinitely reinvested outside the U.S., the U.S. rate on such
foreign-source income can be said to be zero. Since multinational corporations typically use
non-U.S. subsidiaries to conduct foreign activities, and do not provide for deferred U.S.
taxes with respect to such activities, changes in the U.S. taxation of foreign-source income
generally will not have a material effect on the deferred tax account.232Schwarz, Merrill & Edwards
credit equal to the excess of tentative minimum tax over regular tax. This
credit, which does not expire, may be used in the future to reduce the
amount of tax required to be paid in any periods where regular tax
exceeds AMT.
If it is more likely than not that the benefit of some or all of the
deferred-tax asset will not be realized, a valuation allowance is required
to reduce the balance in the account to the amount that is likely to be
realized. Because carryforwards, other than the minimum tax credit,
expire if not used within a fixed period of time, valuation allowances are
frequently required to offset some or all of the deferred benefit that
would otherwise accompany the carryforward. The financial accounting
tax expense is reduced, compared to the amount actually required to be
paid, by an amount equal to the net increase in any deferred-tax-asset
account for the period.
FAS 109 measures deferred tax liabilities and assets using the enacted
tax rates expected to apply to taxable income in the periods in which the
deferred tax liability or asset is expected to be settled or realized. The
balance in any deferred-tax account must be adjusted to reflect any
change in rates in the period in which the rate change is enacted. For
example, if legislation were enacted cutting the present tax rate in half,
the balance in both the tax liability and asset accounts generally would
also be cut in half, since the future consequences the accounts represent
would now occur at the new rate.4
FAS 109 identifies the temporary differences that give rise to deferred
assets and liabilities according to the enacted laws. The identity and
amount of the temporary differences must be adjusted at the time of
enactment for changes in law.
2.1.2 Other Financial-Statement AccountsIn addition to tax expense
and the current- and deferred-tax-asset or -liability accounts, a number
of other financial statement accounts may be affected by the income tax.
For example, exfraordinary items are generally required to be reported
net of their tax effect.
2.2 Financial Accounting for Fundamental Tax Reform
The impact of the enactment of fundamental tax reform on reported finan-
cial accounting information wifi depend upon the type of reformen-
4 Some exceptions to this general rule exist with regard to deferred-taxassets. Credit
carryforwards, because they are stated in terms of dollars rather than as future deductions
to which the new, lower rate would apply, would not have to be restated. Further, any
valuation allowance would have to be recalculated to apply the reduced tax rate, but the
resultant change would not necessarily be in proportion to the change in the rate.Transitional Issues in Fundamental Tax Reform233
acted, the transitional rules that accompany that reform, and the reaction
of those institutions responsible for the setting of financial accounting
standards, most notably the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) and its Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF).
Issues that would have to be decided include:
Will deferred-tax consequences, including tax expense and deferred-
tax accounts, continue to be recorded for financial accounting pur-
poses, or wifi transactions instead be stated net oftheir tax effect?
If deferred-tax consequences continue to be recorded, will their mea-
surement follow a methodology similar to that currently employed by
FAS 109?
Wifi any change in the balance of the deferred-tax account (including
its elimination) be reflected through the income statements or re-
corded directly to equity?
If the change in the deferred-tax account is reflected through the in-
come statement, will its effect be recognized immediately or over
time? Wifi this item be recorded as an extraordinary item or a cumula-
tive adjustment?
Enactment of fundamental tax reform is expected to be directly re-
flected in the tax accounts, i.e., deferred tax assets and liabilities and tax
expense. The future tax consequences of those events thathave been
recognized previously in the financial statement, but have not yet been
reflected in the tax return, will almost certainly be different after the
enactment of fundamental reform. This will necessitate a change in the
balance of the deferred tax liability or asset and a corresponding adjust-
ment to either current income or retained earnings. The extentof this
change wifi be heavily influenced by the type of transitional rules that
are included in the enacted reform.
A decision to eliminate deferred-tax accounting and cease measuring
tax expense for financial accounting stifi requires an adjustment tothe
present-tax accounts. If the deferred-tax accounts are no longer required,
they wifi most likely be eliminated and their elimination wifi require an
offsetting entry. The amount of any net deferred tax liability that is
eliminated wifi either increase income or be taken directly as an increase
to equity. The amount of any net deferred-tax asset will decreaseincome
or retained earnings.
Most fundamental tax reform proposals would eliminate the taxation
of amounts that are repatriated, as dividends or otherwise, from foreign
affiliates. While this would likely result in greater repatriation, it is not
expected to affect directly the deferred-tax-liability account. Firms are234Schwarz, Merrill & Edwards
not required to provide deferred taxes for amounts that could result
from the remittance of undistributed earnings of foreign subsidiaries
and joint ventures if the business intends to continue to reinvest those
earnings indefinitely. Since most businesses do not provide a deferred
liability for the U.S. taxes that would result from the repatriation of
foreign earnings, only a minimal effect of deferred liabilities would be
expected.
Other financial statement accounts may also be affected. This could
occur if, for example, the loss of deductibility for an item affects its
market or net realizable value.5 The tax ramifications of a change from
accrual to cash accounting for tax purposes may also have to be consid-
ered to the extent the change results in items being counted as an item of
taxable income or expense either twice, or not at all. Retained earnings
will be affected, either as a result of changes in the level of tax expense,
or directly as an offset to any required changes in the deferred tax and
other accounts.
For the purposes of this paper, effects resulting from the enactment of
fundamental tax reform wifi be discussed in terms of their impact on
retained earnings. Should (as is likely) the FASB determine that it is
appropriate to reflect these changes in current earnings, any increase in
retained earnings would be accompanied by an equivalent amount of
income, and any decrease in retained earnings accompanied by an
equivalent amount of expense. FAS 109 requires that the effect of a
change in tax laws or rates be included in income from continuing opera-
tions for the period that includes the enactment date of the legislation.
2.3 Limitations of the Financial-Accounting Approach
The financial-statement effects of transition to a consumption-based tax
system presented in section 3 below should be interpreted with caution
for a variety of reasons. First, under generally accepted accounting princi-
ples (GAAP), the firm's tax accounts generally do not reflect consider-
ation of the time value of money. Future tax costs and benefits are not
discounted on the financial statement. Second, most assets (and liabili-
ties) are not recorded at market value, but instead on the basis of historic
cost (with adjustment for depreciation and amortization). Third, the
value of many intangibles are not reflected in the balance sheet, such as
5This is of particular concern for those assets, such as certain types of investments and
inventory, that must be carried for financial-accounting purposes at no more than market
value. Assets used in the production process, such as depreciable plant and equipment,
are not subject to this market-value limitation. Typically, the value at which these assets
are carried for financial-accounting purposes must be reduced only if the nominal value of
future cash flows attributable to the asset will not equal the asset's carlying value.Transitional Issues in Fundamental Tax Reform235
self-created manufacturing and marketing intangibles, because market-
ing and research expenses generally are not permitted to be capitalized.
Fourth, financial statements generally do not provide enough informa-
tion to separate financial statement items between domestic and foreign
operations at a detailed level. Finally, the effects of tax reform, as re-
corded in the financial statement, are based on the assumption of fixed
prices. As a result, a financial statement measure of the impacts of tax
reform must be regarded as a static analysis.
Despite the limitations of financial accounting data, we believe it is
nevertheless important to examine the financial-statement effects of tax
reform for three reasons. First, although the effect of tax reform on
financial statements is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of stock market
value changes, real business decisions wifi be affected by financial-
statement changes. As noted by Martin Sullivan (1995, p. 207):
Because financial reporting is of critical importance to investors, creditors,
bankers, appraisers, and regulators evaluating the financial soundness of
firms, these impacts deserve careful consideration before adoption of any re-
placement consumption tax.
Second, support of the business community for fundamental tax re-
form may be difficult to garner if the financial statement effects are
adverse for a large proportion of firms.
Third, financial statement data generally provide the most comprehen-
sive publicly-available information on a firm's assets and liabilities, in-
cluding income tax attributes such as net operating-loss carryforwards.
3. TAX RESTRUCTURING PROPOSALS
31 National Retail Sales Tax
3.1.1 Overview
Description of national retail sales taxThe national retail sales tax, as
proposed by Reps. Schaefer and Tauzin, would repeal the corporate and
individual income taxes, the estate and gift taxes, and most federal ex-
cise taxes, and impose a new 15-percent national retail sales tax (NRST).
The SchaeferTauzin NRST is similar to retail sales taxes now imposed
by 45 states, except that the NRST generally would exclude all business
purchases and generally would apply to all services.
Under the NRST, businesses would pay tax equal to 15 percent of the
gross amount received for sales of goods and services.Sellers would be
required to provide an invoice with respect to taxable sales stating the236Schwarz, Merrill & Edwards
amount of tax and certain other information. Sales to other businesses
for resale or for use in the production of taxable goods and services
would be exempt, as would exports.
Taxpayers would be allowed an administration credit equal to 0.5
percent of tax collected as well as a credit equal to 50 percent of the cost
of equipment purchased to comply with the invoice requirement.
Employers would be required to pay each employee a "family con-
sumption refund" equal to 15 percent of the lesser of the poverty level
for the employee's family unit and the employee's annual compensa-
tion. The refund would be creditable against the employer's payroll tax.
Accounting for the national retail sales taxThe replacement of the
current income tax system with a system that imposes a national retail
sales tax could eliminate the need to recognize income tax expense for
financial statement purposes. If the replacement system is viewed by
the Emerging Issues Task Force and the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board as a tax on the acquisition of goods and services, rather
than a tax of income, the present financial accounting system could be
replaced by a system where transactions are reported by the selling
entity net of any tax effect. While such a net-of-tax system could stifi
require the recognition of deferred and prepaid tax accounts, such ac-
counts would not be related to the deferred income tax asset and liabil-
ity accounts maintained under present accounting procedures. Instead
they would reflect the difference between cash and accrual measure of
sales-tax liability. Such an approach would be consistent with that
taken by the financial accounting authorities of other countries, where
a national sales tax or value-added tax represents a material part of the
tax liability.
If tax expense need no longer be recognized for financial accounting,
there is no need to continue to report either deferred income tax assets
or liabilities. These accounts represent a measurement of future tax con-
sequences. If tax consequences are no longer to be taken into consider-
ation, there is nothing to measure.
Elimination of the deferred-tax accounts will affect retained earnings
and potentially current income and expense. Elimination of a deferred
income tax liability would increase retained earnings and potentially net
income, while elimination of a deferred asset would have the opposite
effect. Whether net income is affected will depend upon whether the
FASB determines that it is appropriate to allow the elimination of the
deferred-tax account to affect current earnings, or requires the effect to
be taken directly to retained earnings.Transitional Issues in Fundamental Tax Reform237
3.1.2 Financial-Statement ImpactIf replacement of the current income
tax system with a national retail sales tax eliminates the need torecognize
tax expense for financial statement purposes, thereby eliminatingthe
need for the deferred tax accounts, the direct impact of enactment on any
business can be estimated by treating the balance in any existing deferred-
tax- liabffity account as an increase to retained earnings andthe balance in
any existing deferred-tax-asset account as adecrease to retained earnings.
This is the same effect that would be experienced if the income tax were
simply repealed.
DataFor purposes of this analysis, the financial statement effects of
tax reform were calculated for a sample of 96 U.S. corporations across12
selected industries. These include five major industrial divisions (agricul-
ture; mining; construction; wholesale and retail trade;and transporta-
tion, communications, and utilities), six industry groupswithin the
manufacturing division (food, paper, chemicals, petroleum, electronics,
and transportation equipment), and the business services industry.The
only major industrial division of the economy not included in thisanaly-
sis is financial services, which would be subject to special rulesunder the
various tax restructuring proposals.6
Within each of the 12 sectors, the eight largest public corporations
were selected for which sufficiently detailedfinancial statement informa-
tion was available for the 1995 reporting period. Financialdata were
obtained from SEC Form 10K information included in the Standard and
Poors' Compustat database, and from the tax footnote provided inthe
annual financial statement. Given the small sample of companies in each
industry (eight firms), the results presented may not be fully representa-
tive of each industry as a whole.
Aggregate resultsOverall, the financial statement effect of replacing
the income tax with a 20-percent national retail sales tax isestimated to
increase shareholders' equity by 5.6 percent, based on 1995data, for the
96 firms in our sample (see Table 2 and Figure 1). Thisresult does not
include any impact from an increase in the price level that might occur as
a result of this tax restructuringproposal. If the price level were to
increase by 20 percent, the impact on shareholders, includingthe loss in
purchasing power, would be a decline in shareholders' equityof 14.4
6Some primarily nonfinancial companies, such as the "big 3" automobile companies,have
large financial subsidiaries. These subsidiaries would likely be subject tospecial rules
under a consumption tax. For purposes of this analysis, however,financial subsidiaries are
assumed to be taxed under the general rules. See Merrill and Edwards (1996).238Schwarz, Merrill & Edwards
percent (5.6 percent less 20 percent).7 Because the balance sheet is not
restated for changes in the price level under GAAP, the financial state-
ment would not show the effect of such a price-level change.
At constant prices, the 5.6-percent increase in shareholders' equity
amounts to $28.8 billion for the sample of 96 companies. The largest
component of the deferred-tax accounts of the sampled companies is the
$88.3 billion of deferred tax liability that is attributable to property and
equipment (PP&E) and arises from cost-recovery deductions (deprecia-
tion, depletion, and amortization) that have been taken into account for
tax purposes, but remain to be taken into account for financial-accounting
purposes. This amount represents the amount of taxes that have not yet
been paid as a result of the more rapid cost recovery permitted for tax
purposes.
Offsetting the elimination of the deferred tax liability for PP&E is the
loss of the deferred-tax assets recorded for other post-employment bene-
fits (OPEB, at $46.8 billion), credit carryforwards ($8.2 billion), and net
operating loss (NOL) carryforwards ($7.8 billion).
OPEB relates primarily to medical and other expenses for retirees that
have been accrued and deducted for book purposes but that wifi not be
deducted for tax purposes until they are paid in the future. A portion of
this amount may also represent employee-related restructuring costs
that have been accrued for book but wifi not give rise to a tax deduction
until some time in the future. Under present law, the deferred deduc-
tions for these items will result in reduced taxes in the future. Replace-
ment of the income tax with a national sales tax eliminates these future
tax savings. Because there would no longer be a future benefit, there
would be no justification for the deferred-tax asset. Its eliminationre-
sults in a decrease to shareholder's equity by an equivalent amount.
Results by industryOn an industry basis, the impact on sharehold-
ers' equity (at constant prices) ranges from a decrease of 25.8 percent for
the transportation equipment industry to increases of 20.5 and 21.7per-
cent for the petroleum and mining industries, respectively. The large
decline in shareholders' equity in the transportation equipment indus-
try is primarily attributable to $23.5 billion of deferred-tax assets for
OPEB liability, accounting for 27 percent of shareholders' equity. The
large increase in shareholders' equity in the petroleum and mining
industries is attributable to the elimination of deferred tax liabifities
The SchaeferTauzm bill (H.R. 3039) proposes a tax-inclusive national RST rate of 15
percent, which is equivalent to a 17.65-percent tax-exclusive rate. Neither the Treasury
Department nor the Joint Committee on Taxation has published estimates regarding the
tax rate necessary to ensure that H.R. 3039 would be revenue-neutral.Transitional Issues in Fundamental Tax Reform239
associated with PP&E, accounting for 25 and 36 percent of sharehold-
ers' equity, respectively. Under present law, both the petroleum and
mining industries are allowed to recover certain exploration and devel-
opment costs for tax purposes using methods that are moreaccelerated
than are used for GAAP.
3.2 Flat Tax With Maximum Transitional Relief
3.21 Overview
Description of flat taxThe flat tax would repeal the individual and
corporate income taxes. The corporate income tax and theindividual tax
on unincorporated business income wouldbe replaced by a new busi-
ness tax applicable to all businesses regardlessof legal form. Businesses
generally would compute their flat-tax base by deducting from gross
receipts the cost of most business expenses, including capital items.The
cash method of accounting generally would be required under the flat
tax. Initially, a 20-percent tax rate would be applied tothe tax base. The
rate would drop to 17 percent two years after enactment.
Dividends, interest, and income from the sales of financial assets
would not be included in the tax base of nonfinancial companies. Sym-
metrically, dividend and interest payments would not be allowed as
deductions under the flat tax for nonfinancial companies. Rent and roy-
alty income would be includible in business receipts, while rentand
royalty expenses would be deductible, as under the corporate income
tax.
Capital purchases, including the entire cost of property, plant, and
equipment, would be fully deducted in the year of purchase. Gross
proceeds from sales of assets would be included in the flat-tax base.
Depreciation, depletion, and amortization rules would be eliminated.
The flat tax is a territorial, origin-based tax. Income from foreign
branches and dividends from foreign subsidiaries would be excluded.
No deduction or credit would be allowed with respect to foreign income
or withholding taxes. As under the income tax, grossreceipts from ex-
ports would be included in the tax base, and the cost ofimports would
be deductible to the extent they represent business expenses.
The flat tax would not allow deductions for certain expenditures cur-
rently deducted for income tax purposes, such as non-cash employee
compensation and benefits (other than contributions to a qualified retire-
ment account), interest payments, and most tax payments. Lossescould
not be carried back to prior years, but could be carriedforward to future
years, and would be increased by interest (atthe three-month Treasury-
bifi rate).240Schwarz, Merrill & Edwards
Flat-tax rateThe Armey flat tax (H.R. 2060) proposed a 20-percent
rate for two years, dropping to 17 percent thereafter. A December 20,
1995 Treasury Department study estimated that a 20.8-percent rate
would be revenue-neutral at 1996 levels. The Treasury Department esti-
mate assumed no changes in the aggregate level of economic activity,
and did not take into account any transitional relief that might be pro-
vided.8 With transitional relief, a higher rate would be required for reve-
nue neutrality. Hall and Rabushka (1995) estimate that the flat-tax rate
would need to be 1.1 percentage points higher for about five years if
Congress continued to allow depreciation deductions on existing assets
to be taken after the effective date of the flat tax.9 If transitional relief
were provided for other items, such as basis in inventory and loss
carryforwards, an even larger tax rate increase would be necessary to
maintain tax revenues. For the sake of example, a 20-percent flat tax rate
is assumed in this analysis. Use of a higher tax rate would reduce (in
absolute value) the magnitude of financial statement effects.
Accounting for the flat tax How the FASB would approach the replace-
ment of the current income tax with the flat tax is not clear. The flat tax
can be said to seek to replicate many of the economic effects of a sales or
consumption tax, while retaining a modified measure of business in-
come as its tax base. However, income, even though modified, contin-
ues to determine tax liability. While the economic effect of the restruc-
tured tax system could suggest that it be treated for financial-accounting
purposes in the same manner as a national retail sales tax, the continued
use of business income as the tax base could lead the FASB to retain a
modified FAS 109-type approach should the flat tax be enacted.
The mechanics of an FAS 109-type system, should the FASB deter-
mine such an approach is appropriate following the enactment of the flat
tax, are a matter of speculation. Generally, it may be expected that such a
system would mirror the rules of FAS 109, unless there is an overriding
reason to modify a rule.
Assuming that the new rules would generally mirror those set out in
FAS 109, the required calculation would begin with the identification of
temporary differences under the new law. Application of a re-determined
tax rate to this amount of temporary differences would form the basis
of the new measure of the deferred-tax account, adjusted for any neces-
sary valuation allowances. If it were possible to design transition rules
8 Rep. Armey has indicated that some form of transitional relief would likely be addedto
the bill as a part of the legislative process.
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that excluded all transactions already recorded for financial-accounting
purposes from the application of the new taxsystem, other than the
change in rate, no change in the amount of the temporary differences
would be expected. The portion of the deferred-tax accountsattribut-
able to temporary differences could be restated bymultiplying their
balances as of the date of enactment by the ratio of the new statutory
tax rate to the old.1°
An item of separate concern wifi be the transitional treatmentof the
portion of the deferred-tax asset that consists ofcarryforward items such
as minimum tax credits, general businesscredits, foreign tax credits, and
net operating losses. If these items are not allowed toreduce future taxes
under the new system, their value will be lost and with itthe balance in
the deferred-tax-asset account they represent. On theother hand, if
transitional rules are included that increase the likelthood thatthe bene-
fit of these items will be received, the need for valuationallowances
against them may be reduced or eliminated. Maximumtransitional relief
would be achieved if the value of all credit carryforwards werepreserved
and the only change in the valuation of net operating-losscarryforwards
were the change in rates.
3.2.2 Financial-Statement Impact The impact of enacting anytax
change where an FAS 109-type system continues to applywill be the
difference between the balances in the tax accounts immediatelybefore
and after the enactment of the change.
If it were possible to design and enact a flat tax with thishypothetical
maximum transitional relief, the deferred-tax accountsimmediately after
enactment would equal the amount of deductible temporarydiffer-
ences11 and net operating losses restated to the new rate, plusthe exist-
ing amount of credit carryforwards. Assuming a prior rateof 35 percent
and a new rate of 20 percent, the net change in shareholder'sequity
10 This conclusion assumes that graduated income-tax rates do not apply or are not mate-
rial with respect to the company. Since the majority of the benefits ofgraduated Federal
income tax rates are recaptured between $100,000 and $335,000of taxable income, this
assumption is reasonable for the purposes of this study. However, certainindustries enjoy
permanent tax benefits (for example, depletion of excess basis in the miningindustry) that
are reflected for financial accounting throughreduced tax rates. For industries with tax
rates materially different then the statutory rate, the restatementshould be done using the
ratio of the new statutory rate to the effective rate currently used forfinancial-statement
purposes.
11 Under FAS 109, deductible temporary differences are those temporary differences that
result in deductible amounts when the related asset or liability isrecovered or settled. For
the purposes of this study, the deductible temporary differences arethe amounts de-
scribed in columns 3 through 6 of Table 1.242Schwarz, Merrill & Edwards
would be equal to 15 percent (35 percent less 20 percent) of the tempo-
rary differences not attributable to credit carryforwards.12
If maximum transitional relief applies, replacement of the federal in-
come tax with the flat tax would increase shareholder's equity for sam-
pled companies by an average of 3.1 percent (see Table 3 and Figure 2).
This increase in shareholders' equity is less than that estimated for the
retail sales tax (5.6 percent), under a constant-price assumption, primar-
ily because the income tax rate is viewed as dropping to 20 percent rather
than zero. Industry effects are approximately proportional to thoseun-
der the retail sales tax scenario.13
3.3 Flat Tax with No Transitional Relief
3.3.1 Overview As noted above, the impact of enacting any tax change
where an FAS 109-type system continues to apply wifi be the difference
between the balances in the tax accounts immediately before and after
the enactment of the change. Unless maximum transitional reliefap-
plies, there will be some change in the temporary differences that will
have to be taken into account, as well as the rate to be applied. In
addition, the absence of transitional relief could affect the balance in
other accounts.
Enactment of a flat tax without transitional relief would have wide-
spread ramifications for the calculation of the deferred tax account. No
attempt has been made to model all of these effects; instead, our ap-
proach is to focus on a small number of the most important items,
specifically:
Tax rate change
Unrecovered tax basis in PP&E
Unrecovered tax basis in inventory
Deduction for OPEB and other employment-related liabilities
Transition from accrual to cash accounting
Net operating-loss carryforwards
Credit carryforwards
We first calculate the effect of the tax rate change, assuming maximum
transition relief (as in the preceding case), and then examine the impact
12A firm's applicable tax rate under FAS 109 is determined in a separate calculation and
may not equal the top marginal federal income-tax rate (see footnote 10, supra).
13The industry effects are not precisely proportional because a rate reduction does not
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of eliminating transitional relief for items 2-7 above at the new tax rate
(assumed to be 20 percent).14
PP&E and inventoryAbsent transition relief, the adjusted tax basis in
property, plant, and equipment and inventory wifi neverbe recovered.
The tax basis in PP&E and inventory is not shown on the financial state-
ment and consequently had to be estimated bymultiplying the world-
wide book basis by the ratio of domestic to worldwide assets, based on
segment reporting included in the financial statement.Second, the differ-
ence between the domestic book and taxbases for these items was esti-
mated by dividing the temporary differences reported for these items(as
shown in the tax footnote) by the statutory tax rate of 35 percent.'5Third,
the estimated difference between domestic book and taxbases was sub-
tracted from the estimated domestic book basis to yield an estimateof
the domestic tax basis.
OPEB and other employment-related liabilitiesAbsent transition relief,
accrued post-retirement benefit expenses are assumed to be nondeduct-
ible under the flat tax, as the Armey bill specificallydenies a deduction
for employee compensation other than provided in cash or in theform of
contributions to a qualified pension plan. Most OPEB liabilities are be-
lieved to be attributable to retiree health insurance; however, tothe
extent that a portion of OPEB represents unfundedpension liability, the
reduction in shareholders' equity is overstated.
Cash accountingUnder present law, most corporations are required to
use the accrual method of accounting.The Armey flat tax ostensibly
would require use of the cash receipts and disbursementsmethod of
accounting. Absent transition relief, a switch from accrual tocash ac-
14 The valuation allowance is held constant in this analysis. To the extent that a portion of
the valuation allowance is attributable to any of the separatelyconsidered deferred tax
assets (NOL carryforwards, credit carryforwards, andOPEB expense), the loss of these
deferred tax assets (absent transitional relief) would be offset by a reductionin the valua-
tion allowance. Consequently, the estimates in this section may overstatethe reduction in
shareholders' equity (or understate the increase in shareholders' equity).
iS The temporary difference recorded for PP&E primarily relates to differences in domestic
tax basis. Generally there is little difference between U.S.financial and tax accounting for
foreign PP&E (as accelerated tax methods are not permitted).Much of the difference
between book and tax accounting measures of inventory is depreciation-related, support-
ing a similar assumption that book-tax differences relate to domestic inventory.Further,
since deferred taxes need not be provided for the earnings of foreign affiliatesthat are not
indefinitely reinvested overseas, only a minor portion of temporary differences recognized
in the financial statement should relate to foreign activity.244Schwarz, Merrill & Edwards
counting would cause accrued but unreceived income items to be taxed
twice, and accrued but unpaid expenses to be deducted twice. In addi-
tion, paid but unaccrued expenses (i.e., prepaid expenses) would never
be deducted. The financial statement impact of this accounting-method
change is estimated, using a 20-percent tax rate, based on the excess of
trade receivables and prepaid expenses over the sum of accounts pay-
able and accrued expenses.16
Net operating losses and creditsAbsent transitional relief, net operating
loss and credit carryforwards will not be available for use after the enact-
ment of the flat tax. Any deferred tax asset relating to these items would
have to be eliminated, and shareholders' equity reduced by an equiva-
lent amount.
3.3.2 Financial Statement Impact We first examine the financial-
statement impact of adopting a 20-percent flat tax without transition
rules and without regard to the potential effects of a switch from ac-
crual to cash accounting.
Aggregate resultsThe financial statement impact of implementing a
20-percent flat tax without transitional relief for the sampled companies
is estimated to result in a decline in shareholders' equity of 19.0 percent
(see Table 4 and Figure 3). By comparison, adoption of a 20-percent flat
tax with maximum transition relief is estimated to result in a 3.1-percent
increase in shareholders' equity (see section 3.2 above). For the sample of
96 firms examined in this study, the difference in shareholders' equity
attributable to full transition relief is $113 billion. A reconciliation of this
difference in financial-statement impact is shown in Table 1.
Results by industryOn an industry basis, the impact of the flat tax
without transition rules on shareholders' equity (at constant prices)
ranges from a decrease of 53.8 percent in the transportation equipment
industry to a slight increase of 0.1 in the petroleum industry. The trans-
portation equipment industry does not benefit from a tax rate reduction,
due to a net deferred-tax-asset position, and shareholder equity is fur-
16This estimate may be inaccurate to the extent that book and tax accounting for these
items differ under present law. For example, some expenses for book purposes may not be
deductible for tax purposes 'economic performance" occurs [see Code section
461(h)]. For these expenses, no double deduction would occur, and the estimated reduc-
tion in owners' equity would be understated. Some accrued expenses (e.g., property taxes)
may not be deductible under the flat-tax rules, which also would cause the estimated
reduction in owners' equity to be understated.Transitional Issues in Fundamental Tax Reform245
TABLE 1
Reconciliation of Financial Statement Impact: 20-percentFlat Tax with
and without Transition Relief
(a)Based on sample of 96 corporations; 1995.
O')Excludes potential impact on cash accounting.
ther reduced by the inability to deduct OPEB expensesand the tax basis
in PP&E. The absence of any adverse effect onshareholders' equity in
the petroleum industry results from the fact thatthe loss of NOLs, credit
carryforwards, unrecovered tax basis, and OPEB deductionsis offset by
the large benefit obtained from a tax rate reduction onthe deferred tax
liability attributable to PP&E.
Cash accountingAbsent transition relief, assuming a 20-percent tax
rate, the financial statement impactof changing to the cash method of
accounting is estimated to by itself reduceshareholders' equity by 7.6
percent (see Table 5 and Figure 4). This largereduction in shareholders'
equity may not have been intended, as it is notclear that the drafters of
the Armey bill specifically considered the implicationsof switching from
the accrual to the cash method of accounting.If the drafters of the flat tax
intend this result, the electronics and transportationequipment indus-
tries would be particularly hard hit, each losingapproximately 28 percent
of shareholders' equity as a result of theaccounting-method change.
Including the effect of cash accounting, a 20-percentflat tax is estimated
to reduce shareholders' equity in thetransportation equipment industry
by more than 80 percent, absent transitionrelief.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Using 1995 data for a sample of 96 firms in 12industries, we estimate
that adoption of a 20-percent flat tax withouttransitional relief would
Change in shareholders' equity
Item Amount ($ million) Percent
20% flat tax, maximum transition relief: 15,882 3.1
Net operating losses 4,433 0.9
Credit carryforwards 8,233 1.6
Basis in PP&E 52,020 10.2
Basis in inventory 21,451 4.2
OPEB 26,728 5.2
20% flat tax, no transition relief(b) 96,982 19.0246Schwarz, Merrill & Edwards
reduce shareholders' equity by an average of 19 percent, excluding the
potential effects of a switch from accrual to cash accounting. There is
considerable variation in the financial statement impactamong indus-
tries: in one industry, the flat tax reduces shareholders' equity byover 50
percent, excluding the effect of cash accounting, and by over 80 percent
including the effect of cash accounting. While there is considerable varia-
tion in financial statement effects within industries, differences in indus-
try effects are statistically significant at the 1-percent level, except for the
effect of switching from cash to accrual accounting (Table 5).
The financial statement impact of fundamental tax reformmay over-
state the decline in wealth because inflation and the time value of money
generally are not taken into account, but may understate the decline in
wealth due to static price assumptions inherent in financial accounting.
Despite these and other limitations, the financial statement impact of tax
reform proposals wifi be of considerable importance to the business
community.
In practice, it may be difficult to design rules that precisely eliminate
transitional wealth effects, for at least three reasons. First, asset values
would both increase and decrease as a result of tax reform. Providing
relief for losses in asset values, with no offsetting adjustment for wind-
fall gains, would cause large losses in taxrevenues, and would not
necessarily achieve any sensible equity objective.
Second, the amount of transition relief required to eliminate windfall
losses is difficult to gauge, because asset value changes dependon the
speed at which the market adjusts to the post-reform equilibrium. If the
adjustment process is slow, asset value declines generally wifi be smaller,
requiring less transitional relief.
Third, the provision of transition relief to businesses cannot address
wealth effects that are not borne by equity owners. For example,a de-
cline in the real value of assets due to an increase in the price level under
the national retail sales tax wifi affect domestic bondholdersas well as
domestic shareholders (but not foreign shareholders). Transition relief
provided at the business entity level would not provide compensation to
bondholders, but would overcompensate foreign shareholders.
Notwithstanding the difficulties in designing appropriate transition
rules, it should be noted that the failure to provide transition rules that
eliminate wealth losses would encourage taxpayers to delay or accelerate
transactions between the current and anticipated tax systems to avoid
losses and capture arbitrage gains. A gradual phase-in toa new tax
system would moderate transitional wealth effects, but would add sig-
nificant complexity and would increase opportunities for tax arbitrage.Transitional Issues in Fundamental Tax Reform247
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TABLE 3
Financial-Statement Effect of Replacing the CorporateIncome Tax
with a 20% Flat Tax (Maximum Transition Relief),
Fiscal-Year End1995(a)
Items ($ million) Financial-statement
Temporary
effect: change in
differences NOLs shareholders' equity
Industry @15% @15% $ million %(c)
1 2 3=-(1+2) 4
Agriculture (18.3) 38.7 (20.4) -0.8
Mining (1,844.4) 75.7 1,768.6 11.5
Construction (61.7) 10.4 51.3 1.4
Food (2,575.5) 250.1 2,325.4 4.6
Paper (2,485.4) 241.1 2,244.4 7.1
Chemicals 230.7 284.6 (515.2) -0.8
Petroleum (10,025.5) 1,138.2 8,887.2 9.8
Electronics (3,035.0) 71.4 2,963.7 5.4
Transportation 7,713.3 788.3 (8,501.7) -9.8
equipment
Utilities (6,129.9) 165.7 5,964.3 8.4
Trade (965.9) 202.2 763.8 3.2
Business services (8.7) 58.2 (49.5) -0.3
Total (19,206.2) 3,324.5 15,881.8 3.1
(a>Based on a sample of 96 corporations across 12 industries. Industry totals are based on asample of
the eight largest firms reporting sufficiently-detailed data in Compustat.
(blTemporary differences here refer to the total deferred tax account less NOL andcredit
carryforwards.
(c)An analysis of variance for this item indicates that the differences between industry means are
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FIGURE 1: Financial-Statement Effect of Replacingthe Corporate In-
















FIGURE 2: Financial-Statement Effect of Replacing theCorporate In-



















































FIGURE 3: Financial-Statement Effect of Replacingthe Corporate In-





FIGURE 4: Financial-Statement Effect of Switchingfrom Accrual to
Cash Accounting under the Flat Tax, 1995
Source: Table 5.
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